

PROFESSORS AND THEIR POLITICS:
THE POLICY VIEWS OF SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

ABSTRACT: Academic social scientists overwhelmingly vote Democratic, and the Democratic hegemony has increased significantly since 1970. Moreover, the policy preferences of a large sample of the members of the scholarly associations in anthropology, economics, history, legal and political philosophy, political science, and sociology generally bear out conjectures about the correspondence of partisan identification with left/right ideal types; although across the board, both Democratic and Republican academics favor government action more than the ideal types might suggest. Variations in policy views among Democrats is smaller than among Republicans. Ideological diversity (as judged not only by voting behavior, but by policy views) is by far the greatest within economics. Social scientists who deviate from left-wing views are as likely to be libertarian as conservative.

This paper presents results from a large survey of academic social scientists, including historians and legal and political philosophers. We look at the data from many different angles to see what they say about the ideological composition of contemporary social science.

Our approach to ideological classification is to build from the granu-

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Daniel B. Klein, Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax VA 22030, and Ratio Institute, Stockholm, dklein@gmu.edu; and Charlotta Stern, Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, lotta.stern@sofi.su.se, are grateful to the Leavey School of Business and the Robert Finocchio Fund at Santa Clara University for assistance in meeting the costs of the survey; to Niclas Berggren and Jeffrey Friedman for comments; and especially to Donna Perry, Assistant Dean, Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University, for acting as independent controller and certifying the results.

lar level of individual policy issues. The survey asked questions about 18 policy issues, selected so as to place the survey respondents on an interventionist/laissez-faire continuum. We also determined the voting tendencies of the respondents. We do not address what is taught in the classroom, which would require a much different research approach.

Our chief concern here is to establish the data in their fullness. Aside from some passing remarks, we do not discuss what the data mean. In particular, we do not address the following big questions:

Why are academics so preponderantly Democratic, and why has the preponderance increased since 1970? This is a huge, complex matter; we prefer to establish the dependent variable and let others speculate about its causes.

Do professors exert a left-wing influence on students? Again, this is complex and speculative, best left aside here.

In policy views (as opposed to voting behavior), how does the professoriate compare to the general public? Our survey questions were asked only of the members of six scholarly associations. Thus, we do not have a basis for direct comparison to public opinion.

The numbers are what they are, but the authors of this paper have developed the numbers in particular ways. The reader will want to know where we are coming from. Thus, we say openly that our sensibilities are classical liberal/libertarian.

Social Scientists under the Microscope

The early sociology literature fixed on the idea that while, in general, elites were “conservative,” college professors tended to challenge the status quo (although some writers, such as Alvin Gouldner [1970], accused the professoriate, especially the academic elites, of being too tied into the system to be anything but conservative). A major figure in bringing survey data and other evidence to bear on these sociological conjectures was Seymour Martin Lipset, who, with Everett Carl Ladd, strove to integrate survey evidence and interpretation (Lipset and Ladd 1972; Ladd and Lipset 1975).

Lipset and Ladd found that most academics are “liberal” or left, and the more eminent ones especially so (Lipset and Ladd 1972; Lipset 1982). Lipset’s take on the subject was somewhat blurry. In his early years he comes across as an earnest leftist sociologist interested in getting an empirical handle on the matter, but later he comes to despair

over the state of sociology (Lipset 1994), and his work sustains complaints about academia being too left-wing.¹ In *The Divided Academy*, Ladd and Lipset (1975, 14) wrote that the empirical record had borne out Richard Hofstadter's generalization that from the late nineteenth century on, "the political weight of American intellectuals, including leading academics, has been disproportionately on the progressive, liberal, and leftist side." Survey evidence starting as early as 1937 showed that social-science professors, in particular, were disproportionately Democratic, and increasingly so in the ensuing decades (*ibid.*, 27ff; on Canadian professors cf. Nakhaie and Brym 1999).

These tendencies contradicted what Charles B. Spaulding and Henry A. Turner (1968, 247) called "a well established empirical finding": that "persons occupying the favored positions in American society tend on the whole to be Republicans and to exhibit conservative political attitudes." To explain this anomaly, Spaulding and Turner, following the main line of sociological theorizing, conjectured that because social science involves critical thinking and an interest in questioning established institutions, social scientists should naturally be "liberal" and, thus, Democratic. From 1959 to 1964, Spaulding and Turner conducted surveys of scholarly associations. They found that philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and psychologists split roughly 3:1 Democrat to Republican. Botanists, geologists, mathematicians, and engineers leaned Republican (Spaulding and Turner 1968, 253). These findings were "consistent with the idea that an important element in explaining the differences is the degree to which the perspectives of the members of each profession tend to be oriented toward social criticism" or alternatively, as with the botanists, et al., "toward the application of knowledge in the business world" (*ibid.*, 247).

In economics, the practice of surveying the tribe emerged later, but when it did, it was much more attentive to specific policy questions. Karl et al. 1979 initiated this tradition. Karl and his colleagues asked economists public-policy questions, and many of these questions were reproduced by subsequent studies, which sought to track trends in economists' opinions (e.g., Alston et al. 1992; Fuller and Geide-Stevenson 2003; Blendon et al. 1997; Caplan 2001 and 2002; Fuchs 1996; Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba 1998; Whaples 1995 and 1996; Moorhouse, Morriss, and Whaples 1999; on graduate students, Colander 2005). There have also been surveys of economists in other countries that used similar questions (Frey et al. 1984; Block and Walker 1988; Ricketts

and Shoemith 1990 and 1992; Anderson and Blandy 1992; Anderson et al. 1993). One of the main reasons for the policy orientation of the economics-survey literature has been the question of whether economists display “consensus” in their views—a hallmark of science. The surveys have therefore generally shown little concern for economists’ party support or ideological self-description.²

Disciplinary scrutiny has also begun in political science (Heckelman and Whaples 2003) and psychology (Ray 1989; Redding 2001). And Stanley Rothman, Robert Lichter, and Neil Nevitte (2005) have continued in the Lipset tradition of surveying social scientists’ ideological self-description. Far from being dated, they show, Lipset’s finding of left-wing ideological homogeneity has become even more pronounced in the past few decades. Other surveys that reinforce these conclusions include work by the Brookings Institution (2001) and the Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) at the University of California, Los Angeles (Lindholm et al. 2003). Such findings are further bolstered by voter-registration investigations, such as Zinsmeister 2002, Horowitz and Lehrer 2002, Klein and Western 2005, and Cardiff and Klein 2005.

The politics of academe is now a major topic in public discourse and increasingly among scholars themselves; for example, a recent issue of this journal contained the proceedings of a conference at Boston University on the state of the social sciences, with a session specifically on the political leanings of social scientists (*Critical Review* 2004, 187–208). This paper is intended as an evidence-based contribution to that debate. It contains extensive analysis of the results of a survey of academic social scientists designed by one of the authors, Daniel Klein, but handled and certified by an independent controller. (We have previously published several articles that make narrower use of the survey data.)³

There is one way in which our investigation is quite unique. Most surveys that ask about ideology, whether through self-description or policy questions, employ the conventional “liberal versus conservative” framework. We find that formulation to be confining and often misleading. In our survey, we instead asked questions designed to get at academics’ position on a continuum ranging from active government intervention to *laissez faire*. This formulation is more substantive and more flexible, in that the raw material it generates can also be used to construct and identify familiar ideological categories, as shown in the cluster analysis below.

Description of Data

The data come from a survey taken in the spring of 2003. It was designed (1) to elicit the respondents' support for or opposition to 18 types of government activism; (2) to make the response format uniform, so that an individual's responses could be combined into an index; and (3) to illuminate ideological divisions within disciplines, especially by voting behavior.⁴

We surveyed members of six nationwide scholarly associations: the American Anthropological Association, the American Economics Association (AEA), the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy (ASPLP),⁵ and the American Sociological Association. One might want to label historians and legal-political philosophers humanists rather than social scientists. For the most part, however, we will be calling our respondents "social scientists." (In Table 3, we provide comparison Humanities and Social Sciences figures, based on previous studies.)

We mailed surveys to lists of 1,000 members each that were randomly generated by five of the six scholarly organizations. In the sixth case, the ASPLP, we mailed surveys to all 486 members. Out of the grand total of 5,486 surveys mailed out, 1,678 (nonblank) surveys were returned, a response rate of 30.9 percent (correcting for post-office returns, etc.).⁶ As shown in Table 1, the individual association response rates varied from 22.6 to 35.2 percent.

If our survey results are unrepresentative, it could be for two reasons:

Response bias. It could be that, for example, Democratic scholars are

Table 1. Response rate by association surveyed.

	Surveys returned non-blank	Response rate (%)
Anthropology	349	34.9
Economics	264	26.6
History	297	30.9
Political-Legal Phil.	108	22.6
Political Science	309	31.0
Sociology	351	36.2
<i>Total</i>	<i>1678</i>	<i>30.9</i>

more likely than others to complete and return the survey. No available evidence speaks to this possibility.⁷ We are inclined to doubt that any such bias is significant.

Membership bias. There could be a bias in the membership of the scholarly associations as compared to the composition of the professoriate in the various fields. For example, maybe Democratic anthropologists are more likely than Republican anthropologists to be members of the American Anthropological Association. When we embarked on this investigation in 2003, we assumed that such bias would be negligible. But the more we have learned about the associations, the more we think that there may be a Democratic/left tilt in their memberships, although we still doubt that it is large (on the AEA, see McEachern 2006 and Klein 2006).

One reason to doubt that either form of bias is large is that the Democrat:Republican ratios that our survey produced generally agree with other D:R findings, notably the voter-registration studies mentioned earlier (which depend neither on response rates nor association membership) and the survey reported by Rothman et al. 2005. However, even if it were the case that the survey respondents or the scholarly associations themselves have a Democratic or leftward tilt, we are not sure that it would affect the general importance of the results, as long as the tilt were not too large. With the exception of the ASPLP (which is interdisciplinary), the associations whose members we surveyed are the leading organizational and publishing institutions in their respective disciplines, so their members can be expected to have more influence in these disciplines than non-members do. It seems reasonable to assume that the more clout someone's ideology has, the more likely it is that she is a member of her discipline's professional association.

Academic Voting Patterns

Since we were interested in surveying those social scientists whose careers were chiefly academic, one survey question asked about the respondents' primary employment: academic, public sector, private sector, independent research, or other. The percentages reporting⁸ "academic" were anthropology 73.1, economics 48.5, history 71.4, philosophy 76.6, political science 86.4, and sociology 74.9. This allowed us to focus our analysis on the 1,208 academics, who constituted 72 percent of the entire sample.

Table 2. Frequency of highest degree held by academic respondents.

Highest degree	Frequency	%
Ph.D.	1151	95.28
Master's	47	3.89
Bachelor's	4	0.33
J.D.	3	0.25
Other	3	0.25

Another question asked the respondent to check off the highest degree held. The frequency of responses for the academic respondents is shown in Table 2.

We also asked: “To which political party have the candidates you’ve voted for in the past ten years mostly belonged?” The options we offered were Democratic, Green, Libertarian, Republican, and Other, listed in that order horizontally across the page, with checkoff boxes. Of the academic respondents, 962 (79.6 percent) reported voting Democratic, 112 (9.3 percent) reported Republican, 17 (1.4 percent) reported Green, and 13 (1.1 percent) reported Libertarian. Twenty-nine respondents (2.4 percent) checked two or more responses, 16 (1.3 percent) wrote in an “other” party, 17 (1.4 percent) said they cannot or do not vote, and 42 (3.5 percent) did not respond to the question.

The Democratic:Republican (D:R) ratios of the six groups are shown in Figure 1.⁹ We combine anthropology and sociology, here and for most of the rest of our analysis, because in those groups, the number of Republicans was very low, and the response patterns to the policy questions were very similar (see Klein and Stern 2004).

Using these results and other evidence, in Klein and Stern 2005c we estimated that the Democratic:Republican ratio for active¹⁰ social-science and humanities faculty nationwide is probably at least 8:1.¹¹ That estimate lines up with voter-registration results and Rothman et al. 2005 (6).

Drawing on the survey data provided in Ladd and Lipset 1975, Table 3 shows that the D:R ratio has changed significantly since 1970. The distribution of party affiliation in 2003 is, in fact, similar to the professoriate’s vote in the 1964 election—the Johnson-versus-Goldwater Democratic landslide, in which LBJ drew 89 percent of the vote among social-science and humanities professors. The composite of Ladd and

Figure 1. D:R Ratios of the six academic associations.





Table 3. Humanities and social-science professors' Democratic:Republican ratios over time.

	1964 Presidential Election	1968 Presidential Election	1972 Presidential Election	Composite 1964/ 1968/1972	Klein and Stern 2005c
Social Sciences	8.9:1	3.8:1	3.5:1	4:1	8:1
Humanities	6.6:1	3.1:1	2.4:1		

Sources: 1964, 1968, 1972, and composite: Ladd and Lipset 1975, 62-64. Klein and Stern 2005 aggregated humanities and social-science results on the basis of all available survey and voter-registration studies.

Figure 2. Democratic and Republican voting, by birth cohort and academic discipline.



Lipset's 1964, 1968, and 1972 findings indicates that since that era, the Democratic preponderance has roughly doubled.

Consistent with this trend, in our sample older professors are somewhat more often Republican. Figure 2 shows by generations the Democratic and Republican proportions in each discipline (limited to those who did not select one of the other parties). The D percentages generally trend upward as time passes, and the R percentages generally trend downward. There is no evidence here that the next generation will break the trend; however, only the economics mailing list contained very young members.

Policy Views of Academic Democrats and Republicans

Figure 3 consists of 18 small panels. Each panel shows the exact wording of the policy question, the response distribution for Democratic and Republican voters, and the mean values.

Our sample probably pretty well represents overall social-science faculty because, although the economists had a relatively low response rate (26.6 percent) and a low academic rate (48.5 percent), they are here part of a sample that does *not* include many of the social-science disciplines, such as psychology and women's studies, which, we are

Figure 3. Policy-issue response distributions of academic Democrats (solid) and Republicans (striped).






Figure 3. (continued)


Workplace safety regulation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).




Pharmaceutical market regulation by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).




Air-quality and water-quality regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).



Laws making it illegal for private parties to discriminate (on the basis of race, gender, age, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation) against other private parties, in employment or accommodations.



Laws restricting the use and exchange of "hard" drugs such as cocaine and heroin.



Laws restricting prostitution.






Figure 3. Policy-issue response distributions of academic Democrats (solid) and Republicans (striped). (continued)


Laws restricting gambling.




Laws restricting gun ownership.




Government ownership of industrial enterprises.




Redistribution policies (transfer and aid programs and tax progressivity).



Government production of schooling (K through 12).




Using monetary policy to tune the economy.




confident, are neither as Republican as economics tends to be, nor as skeptical of government action. We derive this judgment from voter-registration data spanning all disciplines (Cardiff and Klein 2006) and from many conversations with social scientists in various fields. Even though economics is whittled down in our sample by the response rate and the academic variable, those whittlings probably compensate

Figure 3. (continued)


Using fiscal policy to tune the economy.




Tighter rather than looser controls on immigration.



American military aid or presence abroad to promote democracy and the rule of law.



Foreign aid and assistance by such organizations as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and US AID.



for the narrowness of the set of social-science disciplines that we sampled.

The eighteen panels of Figure 3 provide a good opportunity to make some basic points about the data.

1. *Democrats and Republicans generally fit the ideal types of liberals and conservatives.* The ideal-typical liberal is suspicious of private business and market forces (“capitalism”). She tends to be permissive about “deviant” lifestyles and choices (Ladd and Lipset 1975, 39; Redding 2001, 205). She is likely to support government policies to protect the poor and the excluded, and to believe in government regulation as a means to correct social problems such as racism. She tends toward pacifism and suspicion of American military intervention abroad. The ideal-typical conservative is friendlier to private business and market forces. He tends to be intolerant of “immoral” lifestyles and choices. He is suspicious of government economic intervention, and believes in self-reliance rather than government protection, even when it comes to policing (and thus

gun ownership) and education. He is a patriot and he believes that the government should protect the American people from external threats; thus, he is more favorable to military action and to immigration restrictions.

The policy differences between the social-scientist Democrats and Republicans generally match the way that the ideal types lead us to think liberals and conservatives would differ. *Relative to the Democratic social scientists, the Republicans oppose government action in the economy (tariffs; the minimum wage; workplace-safety, pharmaceutical, and environmental regulation; government ownership of industry). In relative terms, the Republican professors also oppose gun control, anti-discrimination regulation, and public education. And relative to the Republicans, the Democrats are opposed to government intervention abroad, to restricting immigration, and to laws against hard drugs and prostitution, although they are not appreciably different from Republicans when it comes to laws against gambling.*

2. *Laissez faire is rare.* Despite the differences in their relative views, the Democrats and Republicans whom we surveyed agree with each other enough to give us pause about the applicability of the ideological ideal types (at least when it comes to social-science professors). Both Republican and Democratic respondents in our sample are quite interventionist in absolute terms, even when the ideological type suggests that they should be somewhat *laissez faire*.

The political rhetoric of Republican politicians often favors “free markets” and “free enterprise.” However, the Republican professors are not opponents of economic regulation and redistribution per se. And while Democrats often say that they favor tolerating diverse lifestyles, the Democratic professors do not, in absolute terms, oppose restrictions on hard drugs, prostitution, and gambling; nor are they very strong opponents of military action abroad (at least in the abstract). The eighteen panels show that the vast majority of social-science professors are quite interventionist in absolute rather than relative terms, regardless of party.

On 12 of the 18 policy issues, both the average Democratic response and the average Republican response is 3.00 or lower, indicating support for the government activity in question. The Democrats indicate *strong* support of government intervention (that is, a mean response lower than 1.5) on 8 of the 18 public policies: minimum-wage laws, workplace-safety regulation, food and drug regulation, environmental regulation, anti-discrimination laws, gun control, income redistribution, and public schools. The highest (most anti-interven-

Table 4. Both Democratic and Republican social scientists are quite interventionist.

	N scores	All 18 policies combined
Dem. voters	962	2.12
Rep. voters	112	2.69
Green voters	17	2.30
Libert. voters	13	4.24

tionist) mean response for the Democrats was 3.59, on immigration. Overall, the Democratic professors are supporters of status-quo levels of government activism (and possibly higher levels).


Their Republican peers tend to oppose tariffs and government ownership of industrial enterprises, as shown by their high mean scores on these questions; but they are significantly more interventionist than the Democrats on immigration and foreign policy. In absolute terms, however, most of the Republican mean responses are centrist. Table 4 shows the 18 combined issue scores for the four groups of voters, with Libertarians and Greens made available for comparison.

The point can be made in another way, as illustrated by Figure 4. For each respondent, we computed a combined score on the 18 policy issues: the strong interventionist would have had a score approaching 1, while the strong laissez-faire supporter would have a score closer to 5.¹² (Figure 4 and ensuing presentations omit the data from the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, because doing so reduces clutter and because the ASPLP sample is small, had a low response rate, and does not clearly correspond to a particular academic department. Including the ASPLP data would not change the character of the results.)

Figure 4 shows that, in all the fields except economics, most respondents landed in the interval between 1.5 and 2.5, indicating that the vast majority of non-economist social scientists mostly support government activism on the 18 issues.¹³

3. *The Democratic tent is relatively narrow.* The academic social sciences are pretty much a one-party system. Were the Democratic tent broad, the one-party system might have intellectual diversity. But the data show almost no diversity of opinion among the Democratic

Figure 4. Most academics are highly interventionist.



professors when it comes to the regulatory, redistributive state: they like it. Especially when it comes to the minimum wage, workplace-safety regulation, pharmaceutical regulation, environmental regulation, discrimination regulation, gun control, income redistribution, and public schooling, the Democrats show much less diversity than the Republicans. Table 5 shows the sum of the standard deviations among Democrats and Republicans on the 18 policy questions.


Another way to make the point is to compare the Republican respondents' overall scores, shown in Figure 5, to the Democrats', shown in Figure 6.

Figure 5 shows that most Republicans are in the 1.5-3.0 range, making them "pro-intervention," but that some are scattered farther in the ideal-typical libertarian direction, particularly among economists. Figure 6 shows that the Democrats are much more tightly packed. Almost

Table 5. The narrow Democratic tent.

	18 policy-response standard deviations
Democrats	17.1
Republicans	23.1

Figure 5. The Republican academic social-science tent.




none of the Democratic respondents scored above the 3.0 level, and none above the 3.5 level. Campus diversity does not extend to the public-policy views that we measured.

4. *Republican scholars are more likely to end up outside academe.* As Table 6 shows, non-academic scholars are more likely to vote Republican than are academic scholars. The same information is used in Table 7 to compute social scientists' chances of ending up outside of academe. Across the board, Republicans are more likely to do so. These results are congruent with the finding, in Rothman et al. 2005, that conservative scholars hold less academically prestigious positions, controlling for research accomplishment.

We also investigated whether the data evince a tendency for scholars with higher (more *laissez-faire*) policy scores to land outside of the academy. When we examined low (1.0–2.5) versus high (3.5–5.0) scorers, we found that the high-scoring, more *laissez-faire* anthropologists and sociologists were disproportionately outside of academe (statistically significant at 0.01), as were the more libertarian historians (significant at 0.05). We also looked at mean scores, but did not find evidence there for the conjecture that those with more *laissez-faire* scores tend to be outside the academy—partly because scholars

Figure 6. The Democratic academic social-science tent.



working in non-academic government jobs tended to have somewhat lower (more interventionist) scores. As we further break down the in-tradisciplinary data into private-sector employment, independent research, etc., there are too few respondents in each cell to let us address whether laissez-faire-leaning scholars tend to get sorted out. Thus, our data might fail to show a tendency for more laissez-faire scholars to end up outside the academy, even if such a tendency exists. It may be that it is likelier for non-leftists to pay dues to scholarly associations when they are inside the academy, where there are professional reasons to do so, than it is for those who are outside the academy, where there aren't.

5. *Younger professors are slightly less interventionist.* The six panels of Figure 7 show the scatter of points for every academic respondent (not just the Ds and Rs), with year of birth on the horizontal axis and scores on the 18 issues shown vertically. Every trend line rises slightly over time. That is, younger professors tend to be slightly less interventionist than older ones.¹⁴ Similar scatterplots (not presented here) show that Democrats in all six associations are trending upward in the policy index, and Republicans in four of the six. That is,

Table 6. Voting habits by academic (“Ac.”) vs. non-academic (“Not”) employment.


	Anthropology-Sociology		Economics		History		Philosophy		Political Science		All disciplines combined	
	Ac.	Not	Ac.	Not	Ac.	Not	Ac.	Not	Ac.	Not	Ac.	Not
Dem.	443	139	78	75	169	61	64	18	208	29	962	322
Rep.	21	16	27	34	20	18	7	4	37	6	112	78
D:R	21	8.7**	2.9	2.2	8.5	3.4**	9.1	4.5	5.6	5	8.6	4.1**

**A chi-square test yields 0.01 significance between Academic and Not Academic (differences in other disciplines are not significant at 0.10).

Table 7. Chance of landing outside the academy.

	Anthropology-Sociology		Economics		History		Philosophy		Political Science		All disciplines	
Dem.	0.239		0.490		0.268		0.220		0.126		0.25	
Rep.	0.432		0.557		0.474		0.364		0.140		0.41	

Figure 7. Younger professors tend to be slightly less interventionist.



almost across the board, the younger academics tend to be slightly less interventionist than the older ones.

If we assume that there is no tendency for an individual professor's policy views to move over time in either direction (interventionist or laissez faire), then these data suggest that social scientists as a group are slightly more laissez faire than in, say, 1970. Pooling all the academic social scientists, regardless of party, the six issues with the largest correlation coefficients between birth years and policy positions—meaning the issues showing the greatest trends toward laissez faire—are fiscal policy (0.25), immigration (0.22), pharmaceutical regulation (0.16), foreign aid (0.13), the minimum wage (0.12), and laws against hard drugs (0.11). A negative coefficient, indicating more interventionism over time, is found for only two issues, income redistribution and public schooling, but the coefficient sizes are tiny (-0.04 and -0.01 , respectively).

Possibly, however, the explanation for these findings is not generational but *longitudinal*—i.e., professors do indeed tend to migrate toward interventionism as they get older.¹⁵ One explanation for such a tendency might be that long immersion in the academy tends to move

one's thinking in the interventionist direction. Such a longitudinal possibility would seem to run contrary to the widely discussed view that ideological migrants tend to go in the laissez-faire direction because their interventionist instincts and ideals get "mugged by reality," such that their hopeful notions about government and the political process disintegrate.

Another type of explanation might have to do with the respondents' interpretation of the questions. Older respondents, who perhaps more vividly remember the time when the rudiments of the regulatory and redistributive state were being established, may interpret the questions as they naturally would have been interpreted during the New Deal years experienced by their parents, or the New Frontier/Great Society days of their own youth: namely, as asking about whether there should be any government action in the areas in question at all. Younger respondents, however, may so take for granted the legitimacy of such action that they interpret the questions as being about whether there should be *more* regulatory and redistributive activity in these areas than there is already.

All we know for sure is that younger professors seem to answer the questions in a slightly less interventionist fashion than older ones.

Cross-Tabulation of Policy Scores: Statistical Remarks

In the tables below, we tabulate policy scores by discipline and political party. The policy issues (except for monetary policy)¹⁶ are separated into five subgroups: economic intervention, government protection of the disadvantaged, gun control, international activism, and personal-choice regulation. The disciplines are ordered by their D:R ratios.

In Table 8, consider the first entry for the minimum wage. The number, 1.12, is the mean (average) of all the responses of Democratic-voting anthropology and sociology respondents. The survey format did not allow a respondent to give a response of 1.12, however. The actual response choices were categorical: 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. The categorical nature of the responses (i.e., the fact that they are "ordinal data") implies that any supposition of a normal distribution of responses is clearly wrong: all the data are in fact located at five points. Therefore, strictly speaking, the assumptions presupposed by t-testing—which is based on the mean—do not hold, and the "proper" statistical approach is either chi-square or Mann-Whitney testing, both of which are based on the median.

We have done testing on the median (in both chi-square and Mann-Whitney varieties). However, we also did t-testing, based on the mean. In the following tables we report the latter, not the former, for two reasons. First, although a respondent cannot respond "1.12" to the minimum-wage question, the fact that the mean of all the responses was 1.12 tells us much more than the fact that the median response was 1; we therefore show the statistical test (the t-test) that is based on the more meaningful statistic. Second, it turns out that the two types of tests for the median (at the 0.01 level) yield very similar results to the t-tests.

Issue by Issue, and by Discipline

The intradisciplinary t-tests show that many of the differences between Democrats and Republicans are significant at the 0.01 level (see Table 8, footnote a). The intraparty, interdiscipline tests use anthropology-sociology as the reference group (see footnotes b and c). For instance, Democrats in political science are less supportive of the minimum wage than Democrats in anthropology and sociology.

In nearly every case, academic economists of both parties are less supportive of economic intervention than their counterparts in the other disciplines. This does not translate into an economists' consensus, however. Adding up the differences between the Democrats and the Republicans (the last row of Table 8) suggests that the difference between the two parties is actually the largest in economics. The standard deviations among the Democrats (the larger of the two groups of economists) also indicate that on most economic-policy issues, the Democrats in economics show more variation than do those in the other disciplines.

Table 9 treats the role of government as a protector of the disadvantaged. On three of the four issues, there are significant (0.01-percent level) differences between the Democrats and Republicans in all the surveyed disciplines (indicated by footnote a). The differences among the disciplines include the following: Democrats in political science and economics are more supportive of foreign aid than are those in anthropology-sociology; and the Republicans in history and economics are less supportive of anti-discrimination laws than are those in anthropology-sociology.

Table 10 shows that the Democratic social scientists, overall, are

Table 8. Democratic and Republican social scientists' views about economic intervention.

	Means (SD)							
	Anthropology-Sociology		History		Political Science		Economics	
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R
Minimum-wage laws	1.12 (0.46)	2.33 ^a (1.35)	1.11 (0.45)	2.30 ^a (1.34)	1.26 ^b (0.61)	2.65 ^a (1.35)	2.35 ^b (1.30)	4.37 ^{ac} (0.19)
Workplace-safety regulations (OSHA)	1.11 (0.41)	1.62 ^a (0.86)	1.09 (0.31)	1.95 ^a (1.05)	1.15 (0.47)	2.31 ^a (1.11)	1.58 ^b (0.83)	2.85 ^{ac} (1.06)
Pharmaceutical-market regulations (FDA)	1.29 (0.65)	1.71 (0.90)	1.16 (0.47)	1.65 ^a (0.93)	1.20 (0.55)	1.91 ^a (1.24)	1.63 ^b (0.93)	2.89 ^{ac} (1.40)
Air- and water-pollution regulations (EPA)	1.05 (0.28)	1.62 ^a (0.86)	1.04 (0.19)	1.80 ^a (0.83)	1.13 (0.43)	2.11 ^a (1.05)	1.40 ^b (0.78)	2.81 ^{ac} (1.18)
Government ownership of industrial enterprises	3.06 (1.18)	4.47 ^a (0.84)	3.03 (1.20)	4.40 ^a (0.94)	3.33 ^b (1.28)	4.68 ^a (0.71)	4.03 ^b (1.16)	4.67 ^a (0.78)
Tuning the economy by fiscal policy	2.08 (0.91)	2.05 (0.76)	1.87 ^b (0.86)	2.30 (1.08)	1.69 ^b (0.87)	2.16 ^a (1.07)	2.42 ^b (1.22)	3.69 ^{ac} (1.52)
Mean of the means	1.62	2.30	1.55	2.4	1.63	2.64	2.24	3.55
Σ (SD)	3.89	5.57	3.48	6.17	4.21	6.53	6.22	6.13
Difference: $\Sigma(D - R)$		-4.09		-5.11		-6.06		-7.87

^a T-test (unequal SD) of within-discipline difference between mean D and mean R responses, significant at the 0.01 level.
^b 0.01-level significant difference by discipline in a within-Democrats regression, with dummy indicators for discipline, using anthropology-sociology as the reference group.
^c 0.01-level significant difference by discipline in a within-R republicans regression, with dummy indicators for discipline, using anthropology-sociology as the reference group.

Table 9. Democratic and Republican social scientists' views about government action to protect the disadvantaged.

	Means (SD)													
	Anthropology-Sociology				History				Political Science				Economics	
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R		
Government production of schooling (K-12)	1.48 (0.95)	2.94 ^a (1.39)	1.56 (1.03)	3.11 ^a (1.49)	1.29 (0.73)	2.48 ^a (1.28)	1.54 (0.96)	3.27 ^a (1.46)						
Anti-discrimination laws	1.17 (0.58)	1.71 ^a (0.90)	1.21 (0.69)	2.50 ^{ac} (1.43)	1.18 (0.56)	2.14 ^a (1.35)	1.33 (0.78)	2.70 ^{ac} (1.46)						
Redistribution	1.32 (0.68)	3.33 ^a (0.91)	1.35 (0.76)	3.60 ^a (1.43)	1.23 (0.55)	3.08 ^a (1.36)	1.47 (0.75)	3.30 ^a (1.27)						
Foreign aid (World Bank, IMF, US AID)	2.22 (1.24)	2.00 (1.17)	1.99 (1.24)	2.20 (1.20)	1.75 ^b (1.02)	2.33 ^a (1.26)	1.79 ^b (1.04)	2.93 ^{ac} (1.21)						
Mean of the means	1.55	2.50	1.53	2.86	1.36	2.51	1.53	3.05						
Σ (SD)	3.45	4.37	3.72	5.55	2.86	5.25	3.53	5.4						
Difference: $\Sigma(D - R)$		-3.79		-5.30		-4.58		-6.06						

^{abc}Explained at the foot of Table 8.

Table 10. Academic Democrats' and Republicans' views about gun control.

	Means (SD)							
	Anthropology- Sociology		History		Political Science		Economics	
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R
Gun control	1.34 (0.82)	3.24 ^a (1.61)	1.12 ^b (0.42)	2.50 ^a (1.32)	1.29 (0.78)	2.86 ^a (1.48)	1.45 (0.85)	3.70 ^a (1.56)
Difference: $\Sigma(D - R)$	-1.90		-1.38		-1.57		-2.25	

^{abc}Explained at the foot of Table 8.

Table II. Academic Democrats' and Republicans' views about government international activism.

	Means (SD)							
	Anthropology- Sociology		History		Political Science		Economics	
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R
Tariffs to protect industries and jobs	3.31 (1.12)	3.65 (1.39)	3.46 (1.19)	2.75 ^{ac} (1.21)	3.69 ^b (1.16)	3.94 (1.23)	4.47 ^b (0.99)	4.81 ^{ac} (0.48)
Tighter controls on immigration	3.70 (1.31)	1.81 ^a (1.08)	3.56 (1.32)	1.90 ^a (1.12)	3.29 ^b (1.35)	1.86 ^a (1.06)	3.68 (1.17)	3.26 ^c (1.43)
Military aid/presence abroad	3.81 (1.29)	1.95 ^a (0.97)	3.54 (1.24)	2.05 ^a (1.05)	3.00 ^b (1.32)	2.16 ^a (1.19)	3.17 ^b (1.28)	2.19 ^a (1.04)
Mean of the means	3.61	2.47	3.52	2.23	3.33	2.66	3.77	3.42
Σ (SD)	3.72	3.44	3.75	3.38	3.83	3.48	3.44	2.95
Difference: $\Sigma(D - R)$	3.41		3.86		2.02		1.07	

^{abc}Explained at the foot of Table 8.

supportive of gun control. Those in history are more supportive than those in anthropology and sociology.

Table 11 shows that the Republican social scientists are more supportive of immigration controls and military action abroad. (The survey was conducted during the U.S. government's invasion of Iraq, which may have affected responses to this question.) While the Republicans in economics are the most strongly opposed to protective tariffs, those in history are the group most favorable to protection. It seems that there are a few nativistic Republican historians out there (note also their immigration score).

When it comes to public policies that regulate personal conduct (Table 12), the Democrats seem to be more permissive overall, but the differences are often not significant at the 0.01 level. Historian and political-scientist Democrats are less supportive of drug prohibition than Republicans in those fields. Among anthropologists and sociologists, the Democrats are less favorable to prostitution controls than are the Republicans, and historian Democrats are less likely to support restrictions on gambling than are historian Republicans. Across the disciplines, the Democrats in history and political science are more supportive of drug prohibition than are those in anthropology and sociology.

Many items in the tables tell us that economist Republicans are more *laissez faire* than the other Republican academics. In fact, regarding sex, drugs, and gambling, economist Republicans are more *laissez faire* than economist Democrats, contradicting one of the ideal-typical differences between "conservative Republicans" and "liberal Democrats."

Observations about Economics

Table 13 provides the means and standard deviations on all 18 policy issues. Economics stands out in several ways.

First of all, the economists' mean score of 2.65 is significantly higher (more *laissez faire*) than the others. However, it is fairly interventionist in absolute terms. The rumor that economists tend to be strong supporters of unfettered capitalism is unfounded. By the metrics of the survey, economists as a group are much closer to the rest of the social scientists than to the 13 Libertarian-voting academics in the sample, who had a mean score of 4.24. The economists' average score exceeds 4.0 on only two issues: tariffs and government ownership of industry.

Second, economics is sometimes said to be the most scientific of the

Table 12. Academic Democrats' and Republicans' views about personal-morals legislation.

	Means (SD)							
	Anthropology-Sociology		History		Political Science		Economics	
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R
Controls on "hard" drugs	2.52 (1.33)	2.09 (1.37)	2.10 ^b (1.17)	1.35 ^a (0.81)	2.18 ^b (1.31)	1.64 ^a (1.05)	2.28 (1.36)	2.70 (1.51)
Prostitution controls	3.24 (1.20)	2.45 ^a (1.28)	2.99 (1.17)	2.40 (1.19)	3.00 (1.22)	2.58 (1.34)	3.06 (1.30)	3.30 (1.59)
Gambling restrictions	2.82 (1.23)	2.63 (1.34)	2.46 ^b (1.21)	1.90 ^a (0.97)	2.76 (1.29)	2.69 (1.43)	3.09 (1.36)	3.22 (1.65)
Mean of the means	2.86	2.39	2.52	1.88	2.65	2.30	2.81	3.07
Σ (SD)	3.76	3.99	3.55	2.97	3.82	3.82	4.02	4.75
Difference: $\Sigma(D - R)$	1.41		1.90		1.03		-0.79	

^{abc}Explained at the foot of Table 8.

Table 13. Social scientists' mean 18-issue scores by party and discipline.

	Anthropology- Sociology			History			Political Science			Economics		
	D	R	All	D	R	All	D	R	All	D	R	All
Mean	2.15	2.39	2.18	2.04	2.38	2.09	2.02	2.53	2.14	2.36	3.29	2.65
(SD)	(0.34)	(0.43)	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.67)	(0.41)	(0.33)	(0.58)	(0.49)	(0.46)	(0.71)	(0.73)
[N]	[443]	[21]	[519]	[169]	[20]	[212]	[208]	[37]	[267]	[78]	[27]	[128]

^aFor the academic legal-philosophy respondents (ASPLP), the means, SDs and Ns are as follows: D: 2.15 (0.46) 64; R: 2.94 (1.15) 7; All: 2.33 (0.71) 82.

social sciences, and as we have noted, many have alleged that one of the hallmarks of science is consensus. If so, then one would think that the most scientific discipline would exhibit the strongest consensus. We find, however, that economics demonstrates the least consensus. Within each party and over all, the 18-issue-score standard deviations are largest within economics.¹⁷ Indeed, of the five scholarly groups,¹⁸ economists exhibit the least consensus on 13 of the 18 issues: minimum wages, occupational safety and health regulation, FDA regulation, environmental regulation, anti-discrimination laws, drug laws, the restriction of prostitution, the restriction of gambling, gun laws, wealth redistribution, public schooling, monetary policy, and fiscal policy. (Polarity among economists is evidenced in the patterns of responses both in our survey and, even more so, in Whaples 2006.) It is frequently on their own scientific turf that economists' collective judgment least satisfies the supposed hallmark of science.

However, on the four issues *where Democrats have a relatively high score*, especially tariffs and government ownership of industry, but also immigration and military intervention, the economists display the *most* consensus. A crude way of reading these findings is that economics goes with higher (more laissez faire) policy scores. On issues where general academic opinion is, over all, very interventionist, there is less consensus among economists; on issues where general academic opinion is moderate or leaning toward laissez faire, there is more consensus among economists.

Statistical Investigation of Voting Patterns

Here we report multivariate regressions to determine voting/policy correlations. The analysis includes the data from the ASPLP. We drop respondents with missing data for one or more of the variables (however, the policy-index variable is computed so long as the respondent answered at least one of the 18 policy questions).

The first two statistical models make the dependent variable voting Democratic as opposed to voting Republican; that is, Models 1 and 2 are confined to respondents who vote either D or R. Model 3 makes the dependent variable voting Democratic and/or Green¹⁹ ("left"), as opposed to voting Republican and/or Libertarian ("right"), and hence is confined to that slightly enlarged set of respondents. The Ns for each model are reported in Table 14.

We use several independent variables. To see whether voting Democratic correlates with generally being interventionist on the issues, we include the 18-issue policy index as an independent variable.

Another possible independent variable is political socialization, which has been studied mostly in terms of the parent-to-child transfer of partisan identification (e.g., Tedin 1974; Glass et al. 1986; Niemi and Jennings 1991; Beck and Jennings 1975 and 1991; Sears and Funk 1999; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 1999). Our survey asked: "How would you describe the overall political-party affiliation of the family you grew up in," and offered the options "Mostly Democratic," "Mostly Republican," "A mixture," and "Non-political." In the statistical model, we include two indicators of parental influence: respondents who reported their parents as being mostly Democratic, and those who reported them as being mostly Republican. The reference category is respondents who record their parents as being either a mixture of the two or non-political.

We also tested to see whether non-academic scholars are less likely to vote Democratic than academic scholars. A positive correlation between voting D and being an academic would suggest sorting effects.

Respondents in anthropology and sociology had the highest D:R ratios, while respondents in economics had both the lowest D:R ratio and the lowest academic frequency. To control for such extremities by discipline, we include as independent variables both anthropology-sociology and economics.

In Model 1 we include a generational variable. According to a popular theory, the universities, having been radicalized during the late 1960s and 1970s, began either producing or attracting scholars more inclined than before the late 60s to vote Democratic, making for a cohort or generational effect (Sears 1983). This would suggest that those who got their degrees in the "radical era" would be more likely to be Democrats than those who preceded (or, perhaps, followed) them. We include two indicators: whether the respondent received her highest degree before 1968 or after 1980. The reference category is respondents who received their degree between 1968 and 1980.

In Model 2 we omit the generational variable, inserting instead a different variable that is also based on degree year. Perhaps by having its tenets taught to those in the next generation, whether pedagogically or by example, a particular ideology "reproduces itself" as it comes to dominate a discipline. Thus, the likelihood of voting Democratic would increase over time, to the extent that voting behavior reflects ideology.

We test to see whether those with more recent degrees are more likely to vote Democratic. The time-trend variable is produced by subtracting, from 2003 (the date of the survey), the year the respondent earned her highest degree.

In Model 3, we replicate the composition of Model 2, but test for Democratic and/or Green versus Republican and/or Libertarian, to

Table 14. Odds of voting Democratic (vs. Republican) (with z-values in parentheses).

	Model 1 D v. R	Model 2 D v. R	Model 3 D/G v. R/L
Parents Democrats	1.96** (2.70)	1.99** (2.77)	1.92** (2.66)
Parents Republicans	0.61* (2.05)	0.62* (2.02)	0.63* (1.95)
Academics	2.24** (4.05)	2.29** (4.15)	2.27** (4.15)
Anthropology- Sociology	3.34** (5.19)	3.18** (5.00)	3.34** (5.24)
Economics	1.47 (1.45)	1.33 (1.05)	1.33 (1.09)
Policy index	0.11** (10.35)	0.11** (10.43)	0.10** (11.39)
Degree pre-1968	0.72 (1.46)		
Degree post-1980	1.25 (0.95)		
Trend (Yr of deg.)		1.03** (2.96)	1.03** (2.93)
N	1365	1365	1414
Log likelihood	-399.36	-397.29	-406.80
Likelihood ratio χ^2	254.40***	258.54***	317.17***
Pseudo R ²	0.24	0.25	0.28

** 0.01 level, *0.05 level, † 0.10 level

check whether third-party voting is significant enough to affect the results.

Consider one cell in Table 14 by way of illustration. In the column labeled “Model 1,” the coefficient for “Parents Democratic” is 1.96 and has a double asterisk, indicating that the variable is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient “Parents Republican” has a single asterisk, indicating statistical significance at the 0.05 level. Thus, the results support the socialization hypothesis: social scientists with Democratic parents are *more* likely (because 1.96 is greater than 1.00), and those with Republican parents *less* likely (because 0.61 is smaller than 1.00), to vote Democratic compared to the neutral-parent group. Also, we find again (with 0.01 statistical significance) that social scientists in academe are more likely to vote Democratic than those outside the academy.

Earlier we saw that, by far, anthropology and sociology had the highest D:R ratios and economics the lowest. With the other variables present, the economics effect does not hold up as significant. That is, a high policy score, not economics training per se, correlates inversely with voting D. (Of course, it may be economics training that raises the policy score.)²⁰ However, the anthropology-sociology variable continues to be significant, suggesting that there is something especially left-wing about the disciplines of anthropology and sociology.


Model 1 does not find a “radical-era” effect. Respondents with pre-1968 and post-1980 degrees do not differ significantly from the “radical-era” respondents. Model 2, however, introduces the trend effect (year of degree), and it is significant. The longer ago the respondent got her degree, the less likely she is to vote D. One interpretation is self-reinforcing Democratic domination, making the Democratic party hegemonic over time. Model 3 separates by “left” and “right,” and the results are unchanged.

A summary of our findings here is that voting Democratic is significantly (0.01 level) correlated with each of the following: having Democratic parents, being employed in academe, being an anthropologist or sociologist, having interventionist policy views, and having a more recent degree.

Exploring Ideological Groupings Using Cluster Analysis

Cluster analysis is a mathematical way to identify groupings of observations (Everitt 1993, 10). Here, an “observation” is a respondent’s total set

Figure 8. Dendrogram of the complete linkage cluster analysis.



of policy views. In our cluster analysis, we are grouping individual respondents based on how alike their sets of policy views are. There are many cluster-analysis techniques; what we present here is the result of one particular cluster analysis that we found to be intuitive and interesting. However, the results presented here were typical of the many variations we investigated.²¹

Using the software package STATA 8, we performed a clustering technique in which N persons start out as N separate groups, each of size 1. The two closest groups are merged into one group, and so on, until all of the observations are merged into one universal group. To define the closest two groups to be merged, we use “complete linkage” clustering, a technique that determines the farthest observations between two groups and merges groups accordingly.²² This technique drops any observations with missing values. To reduce the loss of data, we excluded three policy issues: monetary and fiscal policy (because many respondents indicated that they “have no opinion”), and “government production of schooling” (because a substantial number of respondents did not answer the question).²³

The dendrogram (or cluster tree) shows how observations are

grouped. Not shown in the dendrogram is the actual bottom of the tree, where each person's set of policy views constitutes a single group. The dendrogram picks up where the 1,000 individuals have been collected into 40 groups (labeled G1 through G40). The "N" labels show the size of each of the 40 groups (G1 contains 98 individuals). Above the "tops" of the 40 groups, the dissimilarity measure is represented on the vertical axis. Longer vertical lines indicate that the data contain clusters that are farther apart; shorter lines indicate that groups are not as distinct from each other. These dissimilarity measures form the basis of "stopping rules" to decide how many groups to identify.

At the very top of Figure 8, all the respondents are included in one universal group. Moving down to the first break, the small group to the right is strikingly different from the great mass. (Left or right placement in this figure does not indicate position on any political spectrum.) Continuing down, the great mass gets broken into two large groups. Continuing farther, each large group gets divided, producing five groups in all. Identifying five clusters is supported by recognized procedures.²⁴ The result of this purely mathematical technique, however, is five groups that correspond quite well to familiar ideological categories.

We chose the names of the five groups to describe their policy views. Four correspond to intuitive ideological categories, which we label as "progressive," "establishment left," "conservative," and "libertarian." The fifth group, which we call the "econ-polsci left," is basically leftist but a bit more market-oriented; much more permissive on personal issues; and much more interventionist on immigration and military action. Twenty-two of the 47 members of this group are either economists or political scientists.

The establishment left and progressive groups are principally Democratic (81.7 percent and 92 percent, respectively). The econ-polsci left also mainly votes Democratic, although it also has its share of Republican voters. The conservative group mainly consists of Republicans. The libertarian group mainly votes Republican and Libertarian.

When it comes to economic regulation, the two huge groups, establishment left and progressives, are not much different. The conservatives are more skeptical about economic regulation, but, when compared to the libertarians, the conservatives are rather interventionist.

In Table 18, the differences between the establishment left and the progressives are larger. Progressives are much more opposed to laws restricting drugs, prostitution, and gambling, and they are slightly more

Table 16. Voting patterns in the five ideological groups of academics.

	Estab. Left	Pro- gressive	Econ- PolSci Left	Con- serv.	Liber- tarian	Sum
Number in group	470	413	47	35	35	1000
Democratic voters	384	380	26	8	4 ^a	802
% of Ds	47.9	47.4	3.2	1	0.5	100
% of the group	81.7	92.0	55.3	22.8	11.4	
Green voters	3	11	1	0	0	15
% of Gs	20.0	73.3	6.7	0	0	100
% of the group	0.6	2.7	2.1	0	0	
Libertarian voters	0	2	1	0	12	15
% of Ls	0	13.3	6.7	0	80	100
% of the group	0	0.5	2.1	0	34.3	
Republican voters	42	1	13	23	14	93
% of Rs	45.2	1.1	14.0	24.7	15.1	100
% of the group	8.9	0.2	27.7	65.7	40.0	
Miscellaneous voters	41	19	6	4	5	75
% of Misc. voters	54.7	25.3	8.0	5.3	6.7	100
% of the group	8.7	4.6	12.8	11.4	14.3	
Total voters	470	413	47	35	35	1000
% of the group	100	100	100	100	100	

^a Figure 5 showed no academic Democratic voter with a policy index above 3.5, so it may seem odd to find that four of the libertarians vote Democratic. One has a policy index of 4.22 but is in the ASPLP group, which is not included in Figure 5; the others have indices of 3.5, 3.5, and 3.39. They end up in the libertarian group because of the pattern of their responses over the 18 questions.

supportive of gun control and anti-discrimination laws. The conservatives are highly interventionist about drugs, prostitution, and gambling.

Table 19 shows that the progressives are the most supportive of redistribution and public schooling, and even lean toward government ownership of industrial enterprises. They are also the most opposed to tightening immigration controls and to military action abroad. On those four issues, the progressives and conservatives are at opposite poles. The conservatives tend to be supportive of tighter immigration

Table 17. Ideological group averages on economic regulation.

	Estab. Left	Progressive	Econ- PolSci Left	Conserv.	Libertarian
<i>N</i>	470	413	47	35	35
% Econ or Pol Sci	33.4	27.1	46.8	68.6	68.6
% Anth or Soc	38.5	50.8	31.9	17.1	8.6
Tariffs to protect industries and jobs	3.45	3.66	3.57	4.14	4.91
Minimum-wage laws	1.29	1.25	2.32	3.69	4.66
Workplace-safety regulation (OSHA)	1.21	1.15	1.40	2.40	4.09
Pharmaceutical safety controls (FDA)	1.18	1.34	1.51	2.46	4.26
Pollution regulation (EPA)	1.13	1.09	1.30	2.34	3.80

Table 18. Ideological group averages on personal-conduct/morals legislation.

	Estab. Left	Progressive	Econ- PolSci Left	Conserv.	Libertarian
Anti-discrimination laws	1.31	1.15	1.49	2.54	3.54
Laws restricting "hard" drug use	1.59	2.97	3.91	1.46	4.06
Laws restricting prostitution	2.38	3.77	4.34	2.11	4.46
Laws restricting gambling	2.13	3.21	4.06	2.40	4.54
Gun control	1.40	1.29	2.89	2.86	4.51

Table 19. Ideological group averages on various forms of government activism.

	Estab. Left	Progressive	Econ- PolSci Left	Conserv.	Libertarian
Monetary policy	1.95	2.09	1.98	2.29	3.32
Fiscal policy	1.95	1.98	2.22	2.88	4.30
Redistribution	1.55	1.16	2.02	3.77	4.14
Public schooling	1.70	1.36	1.76	2.67	4.11
Government ownership of industrial enterprises	3.51	2.88	3.72	4.69	4.94
Tighter controls on immigration	3.14	4.05	2.17	2.31	3.54
Military aid/ presence abroad	3.08	3.92	2.55	2.03	3.09
Foreign aid (World Bank, IMF, US AID)	1.95	2.21	2.30	2.49	3.91
<i>Policy index on all 18 issues</i>	<i>1.99</i>	<i>2.26</i>	<i>2.53</i>	<i>2.75</i>	<i>4.12</i>

controls and military action. Those in the group we called “libertarian” are ambivalent about military action.

As an overall indication, the bottom row of Table 19 presents the policy-index scores for each group. The establishment left is the most interventionist, followed by the progressives, the econ-polsci left, the conservatives, and the libertarians. It is clear that the libertarian group is the outlier, a fact that was highlighted at the top of the dendrogram by its being the last group to join the whole.

We constructed a simple measure of dyadic cluster dissimilarity. For the progressives and members of the establishment left, for example, we look at the absolute value of the difference between their mean score on tariffs, and likewise for each of the other 17 issues, and add up the 18 differences. Table 20 reports these dissimilarity measures. It shows

Table 20. Dyadic dissimilarity between ideological groups.

	Progressive	Econ- PolSci Left	Conservative	Libertarian
Estab. Left	8.17	12.61	18.19	38.28
Progressive		11.88	24.22	36.33
Econ-PolSci Left			17.80	28.67
Conservative				24.65

that the progressives and the establishment left are very much alike, with a dissimilarity of only 8.17. The dissimilarity between conservatives and progressives is 24.22. The dissimilarity between conservatives and the establishment left is 18.19. But most notable is how dissimilar the libertarians are from any of the others. The minimum of dissimilarities between them and any other group is greater than the maximum of the dissimilarities between any pair of other groups. That is, libertarians and conservatives, commonly grouped together as being on “the right,” are less alike than are progressives and conservatives, representing the far left and far right of our sample.

* * *

Our main findings may be summarized as follows:

- Democrats dominate the social sciences and humanities. Of the fields we sampled, anthropology and sociology are the most lopsided, with Democratic:Republican ratios upwards of 20:1, and economics is the least lopsided, about 3:1. Among social-science and humanities professors up through age 70, the overall Democrat:Republican ratio is probably about 8:1.
- The Democratic domination has increased significantly since 1970. Republicans are disappearing from the social sciences.
- On most of the 18 policy issues, the Democrats are more interventionist than the Republicans. But Republicans are more interventionist on immigration, military action, drug prohibition, and prostitution restrictions.
- On the whole, the Democrats and Republicans are quite interventionist.
- Economists are measurably less interventionist, but most of them are still quite interventionist.
- Generally, the Democrats and Republicans fit the ideal types of

“liberals” and “conservatives.” Perhaps the greatest departure from the ideal types is that neither group is very pro-laissez faire in absolute terms, rather than relative ones, when it comes to personal conduct (where “liberals” are supposed to be more laissez faire) and economic affairs (where “conservatives” are supposed to be more laissez faire).

- Whereas the Republicans usually display diverse policy views, the Democrats very often hew to a party line.
- Economists show the least consensus on policy issues. The differences between Democrats and Republicans are largest in economics, as are the differences among Democrats and among Republicans.
- Younger professors tend to be slightly less interventionist than older professors.
- Republican scholars are more likely to end up outside of the academy.
- Voting D correlates significantly with having Democratic parents, being employed in academe, being an anthropologist or sociologist, having interventionist policy views, and having a more recent degree.
- On three issues (the restriction of hard drugs and of prostitution, and military intervention), the conservatives are the most interventionist of the five ideological groups established by cluster analysis. On five issues—restrictions on drugs, gambling, prostitution, and immigration, and military action—the distance between the average conservative score and the average libertarian score is greater than that between progressives and libertarians.
- Libertarians are as exceptional in their views as they are rare in the social sciences. The minimum of the dissimilarities between them and any other group is greater than the maximum of dissimilarity between any pair of other groups.
- The “liberal versus conservative” formulation of American politics omits the libertarians from the landscape, yet the libertarian and conservative groups appear to be equal in size in the social sciences.

Spaulding and Turner (1968) suggested that the social sciences and humanities were dominated by the left by virtue of their courageous willingness to criticize the status quo. This “critical thinking” explanation constantly resurfaces in debates over academic bias. Four decades after Spaulding and Turner’s research, however, it seems that

there is now a “status quo left” on campus. The establishment left and the progressives differ little and dominate the social sciences and humanities. Even the tiny contingent of conservatives differs only moderately from the establishment left. We close by asking whether the libertarians, whose views are very different and in an intelligible way, are not today’s social-science “critical thinkers.”

For generations, the leftist vanguard scoffed at “laissez faire” and derided the heirs of Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, and William Graham Sumner as anachronistic dinosaurs. Academe was taken over by a redefined, pro-government liberalism. Now, we believe, the laissez-faire liberals form the vanguard against those who seek to conserve and expand the social-democratic establishment.

NOTES

1. For criticism of Ladd and Lipset, see Hamilton and Hargens 1993. In our view, much of the controversy (and opacity) stems from problems with the liberal versus conservative framework.
2. A recent survey of economists conducted by Robert Whaples (2006) has a style more like our survey (and with congruent results).
3. Our 2005 paper focuses on the Democrat:Republican ratio throughout the social sciences and humanities; our 2004 paper focuses on the policy views of anthropologists and sociologists; our 2006a and 2006b papers focus on the policy views of economists; 2006c focuses on the policy views of political scientists; 2006d draws on the survey results for sociologists in order to propose a place for classical liberalism in sociology.
4. In all three respects, sections of both of the two specialized surveys (one of labor economists, one of public economists) in Fuchs et al. 1998 are very much like our survey in design and spirit (see *ibid.*, 1416, 1420).
5. The American Philosophical Association declined to sell us an address list, based on a general policy of not giving out addresses except for matters of special interest to philosophers. We surveyed all 486 members of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. Its membership is smaller and more specialized, so we have chosen to exclude their members’ responses in some of what follows.
6. At the survey home page, one can view the survey instrument and documents explaining the methods, independent control, and certification of the survey results: <<http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/klein/survey.htm>>.
7. For what it is worth, the Fuller et al. (1995) survey of delegates to the 1992 national conventions had a 21-percent response rate from Democrats and 26 percent from Republicans.

8. 42 respondents marked either “public sector,” “private sector,” or “independent research,” but we included them as “academic” based on their comments about and answers to the two immediately ensuing questions, which are predicated on academic employment.
9. These ratios differ from those determined by Klein and Stern 2005c, which includes academic respondents only up through the age of 70.
10. By “active” we mean those up through age 70 at the time of the survey.
11. When we made those estimates we were less concerned about membership bias. Our concerns about this issue have increased somewhat since then, such that we think that ratcheting the “at least” estimate down to 7:1 has something to be said for it. But on balance, we stand by the 8:1 estimate, as it used the rather “conservative” estimate of a 10:1 ratio for the entire non-economics social-science/humanities faculty.
12. We say “close to” (rather than “equal to”) because some of the policy issues admit of disagreement over what the more or less interventionist (or *laissez-faire*) answer would be. Notably, some would say that toppling an exceptionally oppressive government abroad, despite being activist on the part of the U.S. government, is not anti-*laissez faire*, because *worldwide* it reduces government coercion on net. Reasonable disagreement over what is more or less *laissez faire* would also be found for the questions on monetary policy and perhaps immigration (because of how immigrants supposedly alter the political culture and hence future policy).
13. Fuller et al. (1995) provide survey data comparing American Economics Association members with Republican delegates and Democratic delegates at the 1992 national conventions. The survey contains many policy questions, though not any concerning immigration or military action. The Republican delegates appear to be significantly more pro-*laissez faire* than the economists, while the Democratic delegates do not appear to be either more *laissez faire* or more interventionist than the economists.
14. Regressions using birth year to predict policy scores turn out to be statistically significant in history (0.01 percent level), sociology (0.03), and anthropology (0.10).
15. The survey asked the respondent what she thought about each issue when she was 25 years old. We have not yet completed the “ideological migration” analysis of the data.
16. Here we omit monetary policy because the “intervention versus *laissez-faire*” interpretation fits the question much less well than it fits the other economic questions, and because the question is of less interest to an interdisciplinary audience.
17. The tables here do not show the individual-issue standard deviations for the entire group. The sum of the 18 standard deviations is highest for economics at 22.90, and lowest for anth-soc at 17.84.
18. That is, continuing to treat anth-soc as one group, and including also the political/legal philosophers as a separate group.

19. We say Democratic and/or Green, rather than Democratic or Green, because 16 respondents checked both Democratic and Green (and similarly, 3 checked Republican and Libertarian). Double-checking respondents (some of whom are non-academics) are included in Model 3.
20. We also ran Model 1 without the policy index. In that case, being an economist has a negative effect on voting D and is significant at the 0.01 level.
21. We have created a large unpublished PDF appendix displaying results from alternative methods of performing the analysis. The appendix shows that all the methods generate results either very much like, or compatible with, the results of the single analysis presented here. The appendix is available on-line at <http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/klein/survey/Alternative_cluster_analyses_appendix.doc>.
22. The cluster analysis uses the default L2 Euclidean distance.
23. In the online appendix, we also use an alternative strategy that treats “have no opinion” as “have mixed feelings” answers (hence coding them as 3 rather than as missing), and that keeps fiscal and monetary policy items in the analyses. The results are similar to those presented here.
24. In Table 16, we show the results of two “stopping rule” criteria, the Calinski and Harabasz pseudo-F index and the Duda and Hart $Je(2)/Je(1)$ index. For both rules, larger index values indicate more distinct clustering. According to the Calinski and Harabasz stopping rule, our data contain two to five distinct groups, on which see Table 15:

Table 15. Determining the number of clusters in the data.

Number of clusters	Calinski/ Harabasz pseudo-F	Duda/Hart	
		$Je(2)/Je(1)$	Pseudo T ²
1		0.8771	139.86
2	139.86	0.8905	118.36
3	137.44	0.9261	36.54
4	106.78	0.9031	53.97
5	97.28	0.9225	34.52
6	86.78	0.8744	51.12
7	82.31	0.9454	27.03
8	76.21	0.8694	7.96

In deciding the number of groups based on the Duda and Hart stopping-rule, the rule of thumb is to find $Je(2)/Je(1)$ values that correspond to low pseudo T² values that have much larger pseudo T² values next to them (STATA Cluster Analysis Reference Manual 2003, 97). Thus, according to the Duda-Hart rule, it is reasonable to identify five distinct groups.

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