



Faculty Voter Registration in Economics, History, Journalism, Law, and Psychology

Mitchell Langbert¹, Anthony J. Quain, and Daniel B. Klein²

[LINK TO ABSTRACT](#)

Voter-registration information has always been public, but it wasn't until some years after the 2006 implementation requirements of the 2002 Help America Vote Act, and then state-level policy decisions about resultant statewide computerized information, that researchers could access such information via subscription-only online databases, assembled by private-sector vendors, while at home in their pajamas. Prior to such developments, researchers (e.g., Cardiff and Klein 2005) had to make themselves presentable, climb into their cars, and travel from county seat to county seat to look up the information at county offices. The commercial database used by this study is Voter Lists Online's "Aristotle" ([link](#)).³ These new commercial databases provide political information beyond voter registration, and some databases will, for voters not registered with a particular political party, provide a predicted or 'inferred' party registration. The present study, however, only uses Aristotle's hard information on actual voter and party registration, i.e., we do not use the 'inferred' party registration or any other political information from Aristotle.

1. Brooklyn College, City University of New York, Brooklyn, NY 11210.

2. George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030. The authors thank Eric Hammer for spot-checking and editorial assistance.

3. One can learn more about such services by reading the Wikipedia entry for "voter database" ([link](#)). Voter-registration databases should not be confused with campaign-contribution databases, such as those maintained by the Federal Election Commission.

Our investigation focuses on the Democratic-to-Republican voter registration ratios among faculty in five fields (Economics, History, Journalism/Communications, Law, and Psychology) at 40 leading universities. It is something of a byproduct. The first author here, Mitchell Langbert, is an academic who does research in the academic field known as industrial relations. He was moved to report on the field, and, to do so, a one-year subscription to Aristotle was purchased, with which he wrote his paper on industrial relations (Langbert 2016). The subscription allowed unlimited use during the 12-month period. Facing a zero marginal rate and a closing window, we figured we'd use the paid-for access, and the present paper is the result. This paper, then, was not motivated by a desire to investigate a particular hypothesis, and its findings, as it turns out, only augment and reinforce well-established findings. Other than indicating that Democratic-to-Republican ratios are even higher than we had thought (particularly in Economics and in History), and that an awful lot of departments have zero Republicans, and that, yes, the ratios are higher at more prestigious universities and lower among older professors and among professors with higher-ranking titles, and that there are some regional effects, the paper does not offer new results of any great consequence.

Whether a state's voter registration information flows into databases like Aristotle is a function of that state's policy regarding the matter, and, in fact, only 30 states allow it. Thus the hard voter registration information, and the present investigation, is limited to those states.⁴ The 40 universities we investigated were determined, in early 2016, by starting at the top of the *U.S. News and World Report* list "National Universities Rankings" ([link](#)). The ranking criterion involves a potpourri of variables, including academic peer review, undergraduate academic reputation, retention, faculty resources, student selectivity, financial resources, graduation rate, and the alumni giving rates. It needs to be borne in mind that the *U.S. News* ranking used here is not by any means entirely in sync with established rankings of Economics, of History, etc., in terms of prestige within the field. It should be particularly noted that the two universities found here to have the lowest D:R ratios, Pepperdine and Case Western, do not have Ph.D. programs in Economics and are not among the 76 Economics graduate programs that *U.S. News* ranks. We believe that a ranking based more narrowly on within-discipline prestige would have produced D:R ratios considerably higher than the D:R ratios found here.

In making our set of 40, we got down to the list's 60th university, because 20 preceding universities are situated in, or too close to, states that Aristotle doesn't

4. The 20 states that do not disclose registration data are Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Virginia.

have data for.⁵ Figure 1 lists the 40 universities, listed in order of the D:R ratio for the faculty in the five fields investigated (Economics, History, Law, Journalism/Communications, and Psychology). For example, in ninth place is Columbia University, for which we identified a total of 179 registered Democrats and a total of 6 registered Republicans in the departments investigated, yielding a D:R ratio of 29.8 to 1, which in the figure is rounded to 30:1. (The universities in first and second place had zero registered Republicans; they are specialized technical universities where numbers are small.)

Figure 1. The 40 universities by D:R ratio (Economics, History, Journalism/Communications, Law, and Psychology)

Caltech 13:0	Columbia 30:1	MIT 19:1	Lehigh 12:1	Yeshiva 8.6:1
Worc. Poly. 9:0	Princeton 30:1	Yale 16:1	Dartmouth 12:1	Wake Forest 7.6:1
Brown 60:1	Brandeis 28:1	NYU 16:1	Duke 11:1	Penn 6.4:1
Boston U. 40:1	Maryland 26:1	Carnegie Mellon 16:1	Stanford 11:1	Rensselaer 6.0:1
Johns Hopkins 35:1	UC-Davis 26:1	UC-Irvine 15:1	UCSD 10:1	Penn State 6.0:1
Rochester 35:1	USC 26:1	UC-Berkeley 14:1	Harvard 10:1	Ohio State 3.2:1
Northeastern 33:1	UNC 23:1	Cornell 13:1	UCSB 8.9:1	Case Western 3.1:1
Tufts 32:1	Boston C. 22:1	UConn 13:1	UCLA 8.8:1	Pepperdine 1.2:1


The D:R ratios in Figure 1 are not perfectly comparable baskets. Yale, for example, has neither a Journalism school nor a Communications department,⁶ and (as Figure 2 shows), Journalism/Communications is the field with the second-

5. The 20 institutions that were excluded are (1) Northwestern, (2) Chicago, (3) Vanderbilt, (4) Washington University in St. Louis, (5) Rice University, (6) University of Notre Dame, (7) Emory University, (8) University of Virginia, (9) University of Michigan, (10) College of William and Mary, (11) Georgia Institute of Technology, (12) Tulane University, (13) University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign, (14) University of Wisconsin–Madison, (15) University of Florida, (16) University of Miami, (17) University of Texas–Austin, and the (18) University of Washington—all because their state does not allow the information to go out in such fashion—and (19) Georgetown and (20) George Washington, because they are within 15 miles of Virginia, which doesn't.

6. When a university had both a Journalism school/department *and* a Communications department, we used only the Journalism school/department.

highest D:R ratio. All universities have Economics, History, and Psychology, but only 25 (of the 40) have Journalism/Communications, and only 25 have Law.

Figure 2. D:R ratios in the five fields



In all, we looked up 7,243 professors and found 3,623 to be registered Democratic and 314 Republican.⁷ The overall D:R ratio is 11.5 to 1. Whether we should think that that figure would roughly line up with the ratio of those *voting Democratic* to *voting Republican*—which is not the same thing as voter registration—for *all* humanities and social science active tenure-track faculty at *all four-year* universities in *all* 50 states depends on a number of factors, including trends in voter registration and affiliation (such as a possible Donald Trump effect), whether the 30 states included here differ from the 20 states *not* included here, and whether the set of fields included here differ from the set of humanities/social-science fields *not* included here. Such factors are to some extent investigated and discussed below. Our sense of it: Because our set includes Economics, because it includes emeritus faculty, and because it includes a few relatively Republican universities, our findings surely indicate that the ratio of voting-D to voting-R for active humanities/social-science faculty at all U.S. four-year universities has gone up markedly over the past ten years—a conclusion consistent with other recent research (see Abrams 2016a). For 2004 such a ratio was estimated at 8 to 1 (Klein and Stern 2005, 264), but now we are comfortable with moving the estimate up to 10 to 1. The reality is that in most humanities/social-science fields a Republican is a rare bird. In fact, registrants either to the Green Party or Working Families Party equaled or exceeded Republi-

7. Only 41 professors were registered to minor parties, including 15 registered Green and 11 registered Libertarian.

can registrants in 72 of the 170 departments (that includes Economics).⁸ That is, in 42 percent of the departments, Republican registrants were as scarce as or scarcer than left *minor-party* registrants.

Our perspective

Americans have an election system in which third parties are damaging to their own cause—that is, a two-party system. We regard both parties as, by and large, horrible. We are classical liberals, which is to say that on most things we lean against the governmentalization of social affairs. Data suggest that humanities/social-science professors who vote Democratic are, on the whole, more inclined towards governmentalization than are those who vote Republican.⁹ The data also show that Democratic professors have significantly greater uniformity in their policy views, more of a ‘party line,’ than do Republican professors,¹⁰ and that Republican members of scholarly associations more frequently wind up in careers outside of academia.¹¹ The data show that there are virtually no classical liberals among Democratic professors, whereas there are some among Republican professors.¹²

As for Democrats and Republicans at large, or beyond academia, either among the general public or among politicians and policymakers, it is our impression that Democrats incline, *more* consistently than do Republicans, toward the governmentalization of social affairs, at all levels of government, in the myriad issues of economic regulation, the size and scope of the welfare state, firearms, school choice, and most nanny-state personal choice issues apart from those that involve sex or drugs. On the other hand, it seems that Republicans incline toward

8. About these 72 cases: 66 are cases of zero Republican registrants (and usually zero Green or Working Families registrants), and in six cases there is at least one Republican registrant but the number of Republican registrants is equaled or exceeded by the number of Green or Working Families registrants. In only 10 of the 72 cases were there 10 or fewer professors to look up.

9. Positing 18 government interventions, with support/oppose along a 1-to-5 scale, Klein and Stern (2005, 271) find that average score of the 962 D-voting professors in six fields was 2.12 while that of the 112 R-voting professors was 2.69. See also Rothman, Kelly-Woessner, and Woessner (2011, 68–69), showing a huge difference on “The less government regulation of business the better.”

10. See Klein and Stern (2005, 271–274, Figures 5 and 6), which provides visual comparison of the Republican spread and Democratic spread; also, over the 18 policy questions, the sum of the Democrats’ response standard deviations was 17.1, while Republicans’ was 23.1.

11. For example, among surveyed members of American Sociological Association, it is found that 77.8 percent of the D-voting members are employed in academia, as compared to 44.4 percent of the R-voting members (Klein and Stern 2006, 44; see Klein and Stern 2005, 275 for all six disciplines surveyed; the results for History are report below in the present paper).

12. See Klein and Stern (2005, 274, fig. 6); for Economics in particular, see Klein and Stern (2007, 322, fig. 1) and Klein, Davis, and Hedengren (2013, 122, fig. 2).

government restrictions or activism more than do the Democrats on immigration, abortion,¹³ same-sex marriage, sex issues, drug prohibition, the size and scope of the military, foreign policy, and privacy issues. To speak candidly, we think that, on the whole, Democrats are, often without being very self-aware about it, *more* deeply enmeshed in bents and mentalities that spell statism than are Republicans, who show more diversity—think of all the species tagged “right”—and allow greater place for the classical liberal tendency. Between the two horrible parties, when push comes to shove, we will usually favor the Republican over the Democrat. Langbert is a registered Republican, and he usually votes either Republican or Libertarian. Quain is a registered Republican, and he usually votes Republican. Klein has not been registered to vote for more than a decade and has never voted Republican.

We think, too, it is unfortunate that academia is so dominated by Democrats and other left-leaners. Even if we regarded the two parties as equally bad, we would see great value in more balance between them, for reasons persuasively elaborated by José Duarte, Jarret Crawford, Charlotta Stern, Jonathan Haidt, Lee Jussim, and Philip Tetlock (2015).

The question of why academia is so dominated by left-leaners is, to our mind, tertiary to the puzzle of why human civilization isn’t more classical liberal. But we confine our remarks to certain mechanisms in academia:

1. Academia is an array of disciplinary pyramids, settlements of which are financed and sustained as departments at a university. In History, for example, the pyramid’s apex consists of the top History departments, which produce most of the Ph.D.s and place them best, producing what Val Burrell (2004) called in Sociology the “academic caste system,” but it is the same everywhere.¹⁴
2. The professor’s political outlook is a matter of sacred values. It is something that usually cannot be separated from the love that permeates a scholarly enterprise. It inheres deeply, enduringly, and inseparably in his moral outlook, personal meaning, selfhood, and spiritual life, and it plays a big role in his thinking concerning good interpretations, good standards, and good judgment in scholarship. Sacredness makes groupthink theory (Janis 1982; ‘t Hart 1994) adaptable to the professoriate (see Klein and Stern 2009b, 81–82).

13. Of course if aborting an embryo or fetus is the initiation of coercion against an equal human being then the ‘pro-life’ position is the pro-liberty position—a view that one of the present authors in fact holds.

14. For ‘caste system’ findings: in Law see Katz et al. (2011), in Political Science see Oprisko (2012), and in Economics see Klein (2005) and Chen (2014). See also Terviö (2011, 1061), who writes: “Of all the faculty at the top 10 economics departments, 79.6% received their Ph.D. inside the top 10. For mathematics this figure is 58.3% and for comparative literature 63.2%.”

3. Individual careers are most decisively made or unmade (or discouraged from ever being embarked upon) at the departmental level, where decisionmaking is majoritarian and consensus-oriented. Also, when the members of a department vote to give a candidate a job and a salary, that does not necessarily mean that they will also give much love, and a candidate who expects to feel unloved will not find the offer attractive.

Once the apex of the disciplinary pyramid becomes predominately left-leaning, it will sweep left-leaners into positions throughout the pyramid (or, at least, it will exclude vibrant dissenters). At the micro level of a particular university department—no matter where in the pyramid—once it has a majority of left-leaners, it will, in serving, enjoying, protecting, advancing, and purifying sacred values, tend to hire more left leaners (or at least not vibrant dissenters).¹⁵ Prior to Jackie Robinson black ballplayers generally did not turn out for major league tryouts,¹⁶ and today soldiers select themselves out of enemy machine-gun fire; those are harsher and much starker examples of a basic dynamic of self-selection under adverse conditions: Non-leftists naturally tend to select themselves out of academia.¹⁷ All such mechanisms—the disciplinary pyramid, sacred beliefs, majoritarianism at the departmental level, and the consequent selection dynamic—are the central mechanisms that have worked toward uniformity.

If we regard left-oriented belief systems as systematically defective, we might use Irving Janis's pejorative term *groupthink* to describe the mechanisms in question (Janis 1982, 9). In the humanities and social sciences (four-year institutions, nationwide, excluding emeritus), the D:R ratio circa 1970 was say 3.5:1, circa 2004 say 8:1,

15. Research finding evidence that suggests disfavor (or would imply it given a preponderance of left-leaning judges) toward non-left research, graduate students, academic job candidates, or faculty includes Abramowitz, Gomes, and Abramowitz (1975); Klein and Stern (2005, 273–275); Smith, Meyer, and Fritschler (2008, 87); Munro, Lasane, and Leary (2010); Yancey (2011, 49–83); Inbar and Lammers (2012); Iyengar and Westwood (2015); Gift and Gift (2015). Research that provides evidence that there is little or no such disfavor includes Smith, Meyer, and Fritschler (2008, 87); Rothman et al. (2011, 100–102); Fosse, Gross, and Ma (2014). See also Woessner and Kelly-Woessner (2009, 39–45).

16. On the struggle to integrate baseball, including details on some efforts to secure tryouts for black players, see Wiggins (1983).

17. It is natural to ask how self-selection into academic pursuits would work under fair or neutral conditions. But fair or neutral conditions are very hard to define; we contend that in scholarship and science they will be fundamentally contested and will prove to be inseparable from ideology—most obviously in the humanities and social sciences, but all human intellectual enterprises will reflect moral, social, and political purposes and outlooks, particularly those of the constituents who fund the enterprises (e.g., governments). Moreover, 'fair and neutral conditions' would, presumably, need to extend not only to admission to the 'team' but to all attributes of job and career.

and in 2016 say 10:1.¹⁸ In our view, today the groupthink mechanisms continue to heighten the one-party nature of academia.

The ideological character of academia matters beyond academia. For example: Of the chairs of the President’s Council of Economic Advisors since 1970, four have been from industry or government and 16 have been from the economics departments of nine elite research universities; none has been from a lower-tier institution.¹⁹ Of the six chairs of the Federal Reserve Bank since 1970, three have been from industry or government and three have been from the economics departments of three elite research institutions: Columbia, Princeton, and Berkeley.

Data and methods

Investigating 40 leading research universities, we chose the following fields:

- **Economics** (present in all 40 universities): We treated only the main, mere “Economics” department (not, for example, Finance departments).
- **History** (all 40 universities)
- **Journalism**: Many journalism programs are embedded in **Communications** departments, and we found that the faculty associated with the journalism program is not readily separated from other Communications faculty. Our Journalism/Communications category (25 of the 40 universities) uses the university’s Communications department (assuming it is present) if *and only if* the university did not have a Journalism school/department.
- **Law** (25 of the 40 universities)
- **Psychology** (all 40 universities)

We included tenure-track professors, that is, those with title Assistant, Associate, Full, or Emeritus. We excluded lecturers, adjuncts, and visiting faculty. We included clinical faculty in Law and Psychology, and named chairs were recorded as

18. On the two earlier figures, see Klein and Stern (2005, 264; 2009a).

19. The chairmen of the President’s Council of Economic Advisors since 1970 ([link](#)) have been Alan B. Krueger (Princeton), Austan D. Goolsbee (Chicago), Christina D. Romer (Berkeley), Edward P. Lazear (Stanford), Ben S. Bernanke (Princeton), Harry S. Rosen (Princeton), N. Gregory Mankiw (Harvard), R. Glenn Hubbard (Columbia), Martin N. Baily (industry), Janet L. Yellen (Berkeley), Joseph E. Stiglitz (Stanford), Laura D’Andrea Tyson (Berkeley), Michael J. Boskin (Stanford), Beryle W. Sprinkel (industry), Martin Feldstein (Harvard), Murray L. Weidenbaum (Washington University in St. Louis), Charles L. Schultze (government), Alan Greenspan (industry), Herbert Stein (University of Virginia), and Paul W. McCracken (Michigan).

Full professors. There were rare cases of a professor who was joint faculty such that she was integrated in the faculty list at both departments (for example, both Law and Economics) and in that case she was included in both, but we did not include the professor as a member of a second department when the affiliation appeared only on a separate list of the second department's courtesy appointments.

We reviewed each professor's profile on their university's website, noted middle initials, and estimated birth year.²⁰ The voter registration records, as accessed by us from Aristotle,²¹ indicate home address; when it appeared that the professor lived more than 50 miles from campus we sought additional verifying information, such as published information or résumé information that suggests the professor's residence.

For each professor that we identified in Aristotle, we extracted name, birth year, voter registration record, and party of registration. Then, we condensed that data into SAS-compatible Excel input files, which we transferred into a single self-contained SAS file. (For information about the release of our data, see Appendix 2 at the end of this article.)

We are confident that our data is accurate and unbiased. We can never be 100 percent sure that our professor Randall Richardson is the Randall Richardson found in Aristotle, for it is possible that two Randall Richardsons live within a manageable drive from campus, and that there is no information alerting us to a mismatch and that the professor is not registered while the other Mr. Richardson is. Even with middle initials there may be multiple individuals with common names within a reasonable distance from campus.

In Table 1 there is a column labeled "Not Registered." In total, we put 2,120 professors into Not Registered (making 29.3 percent of the grand look-up list of 7,243). That category would include any professor whom we could not identify as registered but who was nonetheless registered.²² The "Not Registered" category also includes professors whose name generated a multiplicity of matches so as

20. Birth-year estimation was an important tool we used for identifying and confirming identity. Estimation was usually based on year of graduation as indicated on a CV or in other public information such as college and local newspapers, press releases, websites, and Wikipedia. We subtracted 22 from the year of college graduation to estimate the year of birth. At times, we also used year of graduation from the professor's Ph.D. program to create an age range. We also checked whether information about non-U.S. birth was available, although we did not tabulate this information. Of the 7,243 professors in our sample we were able to ascertain or estimate birth years for 4,684 individuals, or 65 percent. Meanwhile, among the 5,123 professors whom we identified in Aristotle, Aristotle gives birth-year information on 97 percent.

21. One of the 30 states covered in this study, Pennsylvania, does not allow the vendor to upload the data for direct access by subscribers, but rather the information is available by vendor access to the names sought, and then it is provided to the subscriber in tabulated form.

22. This could have happened, for example, if a professor lived either far off elsewhere within the state or in a different state. But certainly in any instances where, say, a Yale professor lived in Manhattan and we could confidently identify his New York voter registration, we would record that.

to make identification indeterminate; we estimate that 15.7 percent of the “Not Registered” category, or 4.6 percent of the grand look-up list, were such cases of indeterminate identification arising from multiple individuals with the name.²³ All told, surely more than 80 percent of the “Not Registered” really are just not registered voters anywhere in the United States. Such individuals include non-citizens who cannot register and citizens who refrain from registering to vote.²⁴

One way in which we think our data, if not used carefully, could be a bit misleading is that major research universities tend to reside in ‘blue’ states (that is, Democratic-leaning states); also, we notice an apparent tendency for ‘blue’ states to be more likely than ‘red’ states to have voter-information rules such that their data would be in Aristotle. Except for Vermont, all of the New England states, as well as New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and California—although not Illinois—have laws that enable the voter registration data to flow into databases like Aristotle. The 40 institutions in our sample are from just 11 states, and those are disproportionately blue states. (Further below we report the professors’ D:R ratios by five groups of states.)

In Table 1 the column labeled “Not Affiliated” counts those whom we identified as registered voters but who opted either to join none of the parties or to not disclose his or her affiliation.²⁵ We found that Not Affiliated constitutes 22.4 percent of the registered voters and 15.8 percent of our grand look-up list.

23. This estimate is based on 15 universities for which we initially kept a list of indeterminate-identification cases separate from other “Not Registered” cases. For those universities, there were 98 individuals where multiplicity made identification indeterminate, and there were 528 individuals who *for some other reason* could not be coded as registered. Thus we estimate that indeterminate identification constitutes 15.7 percent of “Not Registered” (that is, 98 divided by 626) and 4.6 percent of the grand look-up list (that is, 15.7 percent of 29.3 percent).

24. Incidentally, focused as we are on D:R ratios, we have given thought as to whether identification problems arising from two people with the same name could possibly bias our results—that is, we wondered whether the problem might be more (or less) common for certain ethnic groups, which vary in partisan affiliation. As we pondered this we saw how factors could work in either direction. As for how it might inflate the number of Republicans in our data, suppose we have a professor Randall Richardson, and we find a (single) Randall Richardson, not our professor, whom we mistake for the professor; since it is more likely that that Randall Richardson is a Republican than professor Randall Richardson, that kind of error would tend to inflate Republicans (decreasing our D:R ratios). At any rate, we think that, by virtue of the information available, all such problems were small enough that we suppose that any such bias (in whichever direction it might be) would be small.

25. The exact options that voters have for being affiliated or unaffiliated, disclosing or not disclosing their affiliation, etc., vary across states.

FACULTY VOTER REGISTRATION

TABLE 1. Number of faculty and voter registration by institution

U.S. News rank	Institution	Sample size	Not Reg. ^a	Not Affil. ^b	Dem.	Rep.	D:R ratio	Minor-party
1	Princeton	181	64	25	89	3	29.7:1	0
2	Harvard	243	59	51	121	12	10.1:1	0
3	Yale	290	78	38	164	10	16.4:1	0
4	Stanford	289	75	42	155	14	11.1:1	3
4	Columbia	346	134	24	179	6	29.8:1	3
7	MIT	115	49	26	38	2	19.0:1	0
8	Duke	346	75	71	182	16	11.4:1	2
9	Penn	205	75	18	96	15	6.4:1	1
10	Johns Hopkins	71	28	6	35	1	35.0:1	1
10	Caltech	34	14	7	13	0	13.0:0	0
12	Dartmouth	98	30	30	35	3	11.7:1	0
14	Brown	134	51	22	60	1	60.0:1	0
15	Cornell	227	68	25	121	9	13.4:1	4
20	Berkeley	268	88	26	143	10	14.3:1	1
23	USC	238	79	23	128	5	25.6:1	3
23	UCLA	391	117	55	194	22	8.8:1	3
23	Carnegie Mellon	82	26	6	47	3	15.7:1	0
27	Wake Forest	123	23	31	61	8	7.6:1	0
27	Tufts	75	27	15	32	1	32.0:1	0
30	UNC	317	59	64	186	8	23.3:1	0
30	Boston College	180	60	28	87	4	21.8:1	1
32	NYU	343	130	21	177	11	16.1:1	4
33	Rochester	62	17	8	35	1	35.0:1	1
34	Brandeis	67	19	19	28	1	28.0:1	0
37	UCSB	160	45	24	80	9	8.9:1	2
37	Case Western	107	12	17	59	19	3.1:1	0
38	UCSD	175	63	22	81	8	10.1:1	1
39	UC Irvine	159	43	21	87	6	14.5:1	2
41	UC Davis	205	70	27	103	4	25.8:1	1
41	Rensselaer	43	11	11	18	3	6.0:1	0
41	Boston U.	244	63	59	119	3	39.7:1	0
47	Penn State	246	66	29	125	21	6.0:1	5
47	Northeastern	116	26	23	65	2	32.5:1	0
47	Lehigh	64	17	8	36	3	12.0:1	0
52	Yeshiva	82	25	9	43	5	8.6:1	0
52	Pepperdine	85	22	15	26	21	1.2:1	1
52	Ohio State	367	109	137	92	29	3.2:1	0
57	Worcester Poly.	21	8	4	9	0	9.0:0	0
57	U. of Maryland	244	55	25	157	6	26.2:1	1
57	U. of Connecticut	200	40	33	117	9	13.0:1	1
	Total	7243	2120	1145	3623	314	3,623:314	41
	Percentage/Ratio	100%	29.3%	15.8%	50.0%	4.3%	11.5:1	0.6%
Notes: (a) Not Registered includes noncitizens, individuals who cannot be reasonably identified because of similarities of names and other identifying information, individuals who have moved, and individuals who are not registered. (b) Not Affiliated includes individuals who are registered but not officially associated with a party.								

Not Registered and Not Affiliated by discipline

In this paper we focus on D:R ratios, but of the 7,243 persons on the grand look-up list, only 54.3 percent were registered either Democratic or Republican. That is, 45.7 percent were neither registered Democratic nor registered Republican. (Again, we reckon that of those 45.7 percentage points, about 4.6 points flow from the indeterminate-identification problem.)

TABLE 2. Not Registered and Not Affiliated rates by discipline

	N on look-up list	Democratic	Republican	D:R ratio	Minor-party	Not Affiliated	Not Registered
Economics	1494	449 (30.1%)	99 (6.6%)	4.5:1	7 (0.5%)	288 (19.3%)	651 (43.6%)
History	1841	1,037 (56.3%)	31 (1.7%)	33.5:1	11 (0.6%)	245 (13.3%)	517 (28.1%)
Journalism/ Communications	484	220 (45.5%)	11 (2.3%)	20.0:1	5 (1.0%)	91 (18.8%)	157 (32.4%)
Law	1809	1,064 (58.8%)	124 (6.9%)	8.6:1	6 (0.3%)	248 (13.7%)	367 (20.3%)
Psychology	1615	853 (52.8%)	49 (3.0%)	17.4:1	12 (0.7%)	273 (16.9%)	428 (26.5%)
Total	7243	3,623 (50.0%)	314 (4.3%)	11.5:1	41 (0.6%)	1,145 (15.8%)	2,120 (29.3%)

Table 2 reports Not Registered and Not Affiliated by discipline. The “Not” rates are highest in Economics, with a whopping 43.6 percent Not Registered and 19.3 percent registered but Not Affiliated. One reason that the Not Registered rate is much higher in Economics is that Economics hires more non-U.S. citizens, reflecting, no doubt, that it is generally much more mathematical than the other four disciplines studied here. Another reason, no doubt, is that economists, on the whole, are somewhat less attracted to either of the two parties and are somewhat less inclined toward moral outlooks that make voting a significant matter of personal meaning and selfhood.

Law is the discipline with lowest “Not” rates. Here we offer a number of speculations, which we have discussed with some of our Law colleagues. First, one reason that the Not Registered rate is relatively low is that we were more reliably able to determine identity because of better information on Law professors, both from the faculty websites and from such sources as the *Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory*. However, that would not explain why Law professors have a relatively low

Not Affiliated rate. One possible factor (for both of the low “Not” rates) is that many Law professors have an interest in prospective employment or counsel in government, in the court system (notably as judges) or in administrative agencies, and to play in those games it is usually helpful to declare a team. Another possibility is that one of Law’s chief missions is to train students for the practice of law in the United States, and so it probably hires relatively few non-U.S. citizens because such candidates generally have less background knowledge in American law and institutions. One of our Law colleagues suggested that lawyers are accustomed to viewing reasoning and argumentation as service to an openly declared cause and hence are less squeamish about declaring the causes they support. Another suggested the following: “Anyone who cares enough about law to study it as a vocation self-selects to take more seriously than the ordinary person the institutional responsibilities associated with citizenship.”

Meanwhile, the “Not” rates are fairly high in Journalism. Surely, journalists’ professional interest is often such that it is best not to declare a team, so as to assume a posture of neutrality and impartiality as reporters. And certainly very many journalists will be aware that voter-registration information can be publicly accessed.

The high “Not” rates do not, in our view, leave in doubt our general reading that the ideological profile of the professoriate is very heavily left-leaning. That reading is based on other experience and evidence, notably survey data. Voter registration data is merely one supplementary variable, useful for making comparisons across fields and for tracking trends over time.

But what about voting Democratic versus voting Republican?

It is intuitive to suppose that registered Democrats, when they vote, generally vote Democratic, and likewise for Republicans. But what about the Not Affiliated registered voters? In our data, Not Affiliated is 22.4 percent of the registered voters (and 15.8 percent of the grand look-up list). It is at least possible that they vote Republican at rates much higher than is reflected in the rate of Republican registration.

Considerable survey evidence, however, indicates that any such difference between voter-registration ratios and voting ratios is small. The 2003 survey used in the Klein-Stern papers was sent to six scholarly associations and asked the question: “To which political party have the candidates you’ve voted for in the past ten years mostly belonged?” ([link](#)). The resultant D:R ratios for the question about

voting are generally in line with evidence on voter registration from the same time period. The latter evidence is patchy, and maybe the voter-registration D:R ratios tend to be a bit higher, but there is no pattern of mismatch (see Klein and Stern 2009a). Other surveys also support the general conclusion of no great difference in the two ratios. Neil Gross and Solon Simmons surveyed professors on their preference in the 2004 Presidential election, and they find: “Averaging the figures for social sciences and humanities generates a ratio of Democratic to Republican voters of 8.1 to 1” (2007, 37). Gary Tobin and Aryeh Weinberg (2006, 27) found that, of professors who identified themselves as politically “moderate,” 68 percent voted for John Kerry in the 2004 election and 27 percent for George W. Bush. They also found that only one percent of professors who self-identified as Democratic voted for Bush, while 13 percent of the self-identified Republicans voted for Kerry. Also, a 2010 survey of economics professors, using the same question on voting used by Klein and Stern, found that the D:R ratio was 2.7:1 (Klein et al. 2013, 117), a ratio pretty well aligned with the voter-registration numbers (Klein and Stern 2009a, 16). We are not aware of significant evidence indicating that non-affiliated professors vote Republican at rates higher than the professoriate generally. There might be discrepancy such that the voter-registration ratio is a bit higher than the actual-voting ratio, but if so, we think it is minor.

One could ask the further question: What about the ideological profile of the professors who are not registered at all (or who are with a minor party)? In our study, 29.3 percent of the grand look-up list were Not Registered (and just 0.6 percent were registered to minor parties). It is possible that this group differs ideologically from the professoriate generally, but, again, we do not know of significant evidence to that effect. Surveys using a set of policy questions indicate that classical liberals and conservatives are extremely scarce in humanities and social-science departments, with the exception of Economics (see Klein and Stern 2005, 272 fig. 4, 290 fig. 8).

Democratic:Republican ratios by department at each of the 40 universities

For each department at each university Table 3 reports D:R ratio and, in parentheses, the raw counts when necessary—very often, it was not necessary. Outside of Economics, Democrats utterly dominate. We have come to expect such domination, but still one may be surprised by the situation. Table 3 might be disturbing to students, parents, donors, and taxpayers connected to any of the 40 universities in our study.

FACULTY VOTER REGISTRATION

TABLE 3. D:R ratios by institution and field (raw counts in parentheses)


	Economics	History	Journalism/ Comms.	Law	Psychology	Total	N of depts. w/ zero Rs
Princeton	12:1 (24:2)	36:0			29:1	29.7:1 (89:3)	1 of 3
Harvard	2.6:1 (13:5)	26:0		9.6:1 (64:7)	18:0	10.1:1 (121:12)	2 of 4
Yale	25:0	17.3:1 (52:3)		8.5:1 (51:6)	36:1	16.4:1 (164:10)	1 of 4
Stanford	3.1:1 (28:9)	33:0	1:0	11.8:1 (59:5)	34:0	11.1:1 (155:14)	3 of 5
Columbia	15:0	63:0	21:0	11:1 (55:5)	25:1	29.8:1 (179:6)	3 of 5
MIT	5:1 (10:2)	9:0			19:0	19:1 (38:2)	2 of 3
Duke	3.6:1 (25:7)	42:0	0:0 ^a	12:1 (48:4)	13.4:1 (67:5)	11.4:1 (182:16)	2 of 5
Penn	1.7:1 (5:3)	8.7:1 (26:3)	6:1 (12:2)	5.2:1 (31:6)	22:1	6.4:1 (96:15)	0 of 5
Johns Hopkins	6:0	14:0			15:1	35:1	2 of 3
Caltech	4:0	8:0			1:0	13:0	3 of 3
Dartmouth	6:1 (12:2)	12:0			11:1	11.7:1 (35:3)	1 of 3
Brown	11:1	27:0			22:0	60:1	2 of 3
Cornell	5.5:1 (22:4)	16.5:1 (33:2)	12:0	13.3:1 (40:3)	14:0	13.4:1 (121:9)	2 of 5
Berkeley	14:1 (28:2)	26:0	12:0	10.5:1 (63:6)	7:1 (14:2)	14.3:1 (143:10)	2 of 5
USC	7:1	42:0	19:1	35:3	25:0	25.6:1 (128:5)	2 of 5
UCLA	1.6:1 (11:7)	67:1	6:0	8.1:1 (57:7)	7.6:1 (53:7)	8.8:1 (194:22)	1 of 5
Carnegie Mellon	4.5:1 (9:2)	20:1			18:0	15.7:1 (47:3)	1 of 3
Wake Forest	1.7:1 (5:3)	19:0		5.8:1 (29:5)	8:0	7.6:1 (61:8)	2 of 4
Tufts	11:0	9:0			12:1	32:1	2 of 3
UNC	21:1	53:1	19:1	18:1 (54:3)	19.5:1 (39:2)	23.3:1 (186:8)	0 of 5
Boston College	14:0	14:0	5:0	10.3:1 (41:4)	13:0	21.8:1 (87:4)	4 of 5
NYU	2.2:1 (11:5)	44:0	15:1	15.8:1 (79:5)	28:0	16.1:1 (177:11)	2 of 5
Rochester	3:1	16:0			16:0	35:1	2 of 3
Brandeis	6:0	10:1	4:0		8:0	28:1	3 of 4
UCSB	1.6:1 (11:7)	34:1	20:0		15:1	8.9:1 (80:9)	1 of 4

TABLE 3 (continued). D:R ratios by institution and field (raw counts in parentheses)

	Economics	History	Journalism/ Comms.	Law	Psychology	Total	N of depts. w/ zero Rs
Case Western	1.3:1 (4:3)	9:1		4:1 (36:9)	1.7:1 (10:6)	3.1:1 (59:19)	0 of 4
UCSD	3.2:1 (16:5)	31:1	12:0		11:1 (22:2)	10.1:1 (81:8)	1 of 4
UC Irvine	3:1 (9:3)	32:0	3:0	29:1	7:1 (14:2)	14.5:1 (87:6)	2 of 5
UC Davis	10:1	31:0	3:0	12:1 (36:3)	23:0	25.8:1 (103:4)	3 of 5
Rensselaer	1:1	2:0	8:1		7:1	6:1 (18:3)	1 of 4
Boston U.	14:1	31:0	8:0	35:1	31:1	39.7:1 (119:3)	2 of 5
Penn State	7:1 (14:2)	9.8:1 (39:4)	5:1	2.3:1 (27:12)	20:1 (40:2)	6:1 (125:21)	0 of 5
Northeastern	5:1	10:1	4:0	33:0	13:0	32.5:1 (65:2)	3 of 5
Lehigh	4:1 (8:2)	8:0	7:0		13:1	12:1 (36:3)	2 of 4
Yeshiva	1:1	4:0		8.8:1 (35:4)	3:0	8.6:1 (43:5)	2 of 4
Pepperdine	0:4	0.5:1 (1:2)	1:1	0.7:1 (10:14)	14:0	1.2:1 (26:21)	1 of 5
Ohio State	0.8:1 (6:8)	5:1 (30:6)	6:1	4.8:1 (29:6)	2.6:1 (21:8)	3.2:1 (92:29)	0 of 5
Worcester Poly.	0:0 ^b	7:0			2:0	9:0	3 of 3
U. of Maryland	14:1	20.5:1 (41:2)	15:1	52:1	35:1	26:1 (157:6)	0 of 5
U. of Connecticut	5:1 (10:2)	26:1	2:1	9:1 (36:4)	43:1	13:1 (117:9)	0 of 5
Total (by individual)	4.5:1 (449:99)	33.5:1 (1037:31)	20:1 (220:11)	8.6:1 (1064:124)	17.4:1 (853:49)	11.5:1 (3,623:314)	
Number of departments with zero Rs	8 of 40 (20%)	24 of 40 (60%)	15 of 25 (60%)	1 of 25 (4%)	18 of 40 (45%)		66 of 170 (39%)

Notes: (a) The department had just two professors. (b) The department had just five professors.

The last column of the Table 3 counts the number of departments with zero Republicans. Boston College leads in shutouts, having four departments with zero registered Republicans. Figure 3 shows percentage of departments in the field with zero Republicans—60 percent in History, 60 percent in Journalism/Communications, and 45 percent in Psychology. In other words, in those three fields taken together, it is as likely as not that a department contains zero registered Republicans.

Figure 3. Percentage of departments with zero registered Republicans

Of the 170 departments, in only four did the number of Republicans exceed the number of Democrats: Pepperdine Economics, Pepperdine History, Pepperdine Law, and Ohio State Economics. Pepperdine is a standout in the set of 40 institutions (although its Psychology department is Democratic 14:0). Also notable for relatively low D:R ratios are Ohio State and Case Western; particularly noteworthy are their Psychology departments, which, with their combined 14 Republicans, alone account for 28 percent (14 divided by 49) of all Republicans found at all 40 Psychology departments.

Assistant professors are least likely to be Republican, emeritus are most likely

Figure 4 shows D:R ratio by professor title or rank. As expected and consistent with previous research, younger professors are especially unlikely to be Republican. In the decades ahead, D:R ratios seem bound to increase, unless a sufficient number of young Democratic professors mature into Republicans.

The D:R ratio is lowest for emeritus faculty. If emeritus faculty are excluded, we get the following overall D:R ratios by field: Economics 5.0:1, History 36.4:1, Journalism/Communications 21.2:1, Law 9.2:1, and Psychology 18.9:1, and total 12.4:1. One argument for excluding them is highly sensible: They are retired and generally do not teach courses at all. One argument for including them is that often they still play a role in department life, sometimes with influence. We opted to in-

clude them because, given the nature of the research, we would rather err on the side that leads us to report lower rather than higher D:R ratios.

Figure 4. D:R ratios by professorial rank





Figure 5 shows D:R ratios by professor age.²⁶ The youngest cohort, age 35 or younger, has 159 Democrats and 7 Republicans, for a D:R ratio of 22.7:1.

Figure 5. D:R ratios by professor age



26. All of the professors represented in Figure 5 were identified in Aristotle, of course. For those professors, Aristotle had birth-year information for 97 percent. For the other three percent we used birth-year information garnered from resumes and other Web sources, when we could, which was for most of them.

Remarks on History

To our knowledge, previous data indicating D:R ratios in recent decades in Journalism/Communication, Law,²⁷ and Psychology²⁸ have been only sketchy, so we do not remark on recent trends there.

Circa 1963, academic historians had a D:R ratio of about 2.7:1 (Spaulding and Turner 1968, 251, 253). The 33.5:1 D:R ratio found here signals quite a change. It even signals a change since circa 2004, when the ratio was in the range of perhaps 9:1 to 15:1. In a 2003 survey of members of the American Historical Association, it was found that among those reporting voting Democratic 73.5 percent were employed in academia, whereas only 52.6 percent of Republican-voting AHA members were employed in academia (Klein and Stern 2005, 275). That is, Republican intellectuals—members of the AHA, most with Ph.D.s—were much less likely to be making careers in academia. Also, younger History professors were significantly less likely to be Republican than older ones (*ibid.*, 265–266). That was based on data from 2003. Since then, the older generation has been passing on, while perhaps young people interested in history, and who do not lean left, have seen the writing on the wall and increasingly stayed away. Writing for an AHA publication, Robert Townsend (2015) provides useful information on trends in areas of specialization within History. Way up since 1975 are Women/Gender, Cultural, Environmental, Race/Ethnicity, and Sexuality. Meanwhile, steadily down are Social, Intellectual, Diplomatic/International, Economic, and Legal/Constitutional. Townsend also gives pertinent information about age trends, showing that the growing subfields are disproportionately younger and the declining ones older.

Remarks on Economics

The 4.5 D:R ratio we find in Economics probably overstates to some extent the four-year institutions' nationwide ratio. Still, it does suggest that the ratio has increased since circa 2004, when the ratio was, say, 2.8:1. Moreover, although the numbers are small, the age trend appears to be present in Economics as in the other fields. Table 4 shows cohorts: The 35-or-under group has 37 Democrats and four Republicans, or 9.3:1.

27. For an insightful discussion of trends in Law schools and the legal profession, see Olson (2011).

28. For older data on Psychology, see McClintock et al. (1965); Spaulding and Turner (1968, 253, table 1, column 2).

TABLE 4. D:R ratios by age cohorts, Economics and the other four disciplines

Age	Economics			The other four disciplines		
	D	R	D:R ratio	D	R	D:R ratio
<36	37	4	9.3:1	117	3	39.0:1
36–45	67	9	7.4:1	519	29	17.9:1
46–55	68	12	5.7:1	611	45	13.6:1
56–65	113	29	3.9:1	719	51	14.1:1
>65	148	42	3.5:1	1,122	84	13.4:1
Total	433	96	4.5:1	3,088	212	14.6:1


People wonder why economists have so much more clout and prestige than other social scientists. One reason is that traditions and standards inside the discipline have been such that checks and accountability on statist judgments have been much greater than in other disciplines. When a government intervention or program receives approval from sociologists or psychologists, it doesn't mean much, since it is common knowledge that within those fields there is little critical pressure against such judgments. But when it receives approval from economists, the approval faces a tougher test, and it means more. We recognize, of course, that Democrats in Economics are not the same as Democrats in other academic fields (Klein and Stern 2005, 279–285), and that in Economics there is a meaningful portion of professors with classical liberal tendency but who are not registered or registered but not affiliated, plus a few registered Libertarians. But we nonetheless feel that, at least since the days when Milton Friedman was vibrant, Economics has been trending toward becoming like the rest of the university. Vibrant classical liberals at the apex of the Economics pyramid are few and dwindling. William McEachern (2006) used political donations data and found evidence that the American Economics Association is more intensely Democratic within its leadership, and Economics departments at the top rank of universities have higher D:R ratios than do those at lower-ranked universities, as we explain in the next section.

Rank of the university

At least since the work of Seymour Martin Lipset (1982; Ladd and Lipset 1975, 42–45, 226), it has been known that highly ranked universities tend to be somewhat more left-leaning or Democratic. We checked on such an effect by dividing the 40 universities into four “Sets,” where Set 1 is the highest-ranked universities. It should be borne in mind that even Set 4 consists of very prestigious, exclusive universities, given that our 40 universities come from the first 60 universities listed in *U.S. News and World Report's* “National Research Universities” list.

Sometimes multiple universities are given the same ranking—for example, four universities have the 57th rank. In creating our four sets, we kept universities of a given rank in the same set. Set 1 is ten institutions with *U.S. News* ranks 1 through 10 (of which, because of ties, there were eleven²⁹); Set 2 is nine institutions ranked 12 to 27; Set 3 is nine institutions ranked 30 to 39; Set 4 is 12 institutions ranked 41 to 57. The D:R ratios for the four sets are shown in Figure 6. In keeping with previous research, the ratio declines with descending prestige.³⁰

Figure 6. D:R ratios by *U.S. News and World Report* university rank




Five groups of states

Again, the 40 universities sit in just 11 states. We found it natural to consider five groups of states, shown in Figure 7. The two Ohio universities are Ohio State and Case Western, and together they make our “Ohio” group quite exceptional from the other groups. In California, all the universities have very high D:R ratios except the astounding Pepperdine with 1.2:1. As for North Carolina—including Duke, UNC–Chapel Hill, and Wake Forest—its D:R ratio is perhaps higher than one might have expected. The group with the highest D:R ratio is the New England group, consistent with recent research by Sam Abrams (2016b).

29. The University of Chicago is the one of the eleven top-10 universities that is not included here, because, again, Aristotle does not have voter-registration information for the state of Illinois.

30. In the appendix tables ([link](#)), Table A5 shows each discipline broken down by “Set,” and that Set 4 in each has a lower D:R ratio than Set 1; the differences are statistically significant for History, Journalism/Communications, and Psychology.

Figure 7. D:R ratios for the five groups of states



Gender

As shown in Table 5 the D:R ratio for women professors is 24.8:1 while that for men is 9.0:1. Using expressed-preference data, the Pew Research Center (2015) finds that in the general population women lean Democratic, 52 percent to 36 percent Republican. We find that only 2.2 percent of female professors are registered Republican. As for men, Pew finds that in the general population they are evenly split, 44 percent Democratic and 43 percent Republican. We find that only 5.4 percent of male professors are registered Republican.

TABLE 5. D:R ratios by gender

	Democratic	Republican	D:R ratio	Not Affiliated	Not Registered	Total
Female	1,267 (55.2%)	51 (2.2%)	24.8:1	320 (14.0%)	651 (28.4%)	2,289
Male	2,355 (47.6%)	263 (5.4%)	9.0:1	825 (16.8%)	1,467 (29.9%)	4,910
Total	3,622	314	11.5:1	1,145	2,118	7,199

Note. Excludes 41 minor-party registrants and three professors for whom we lacked information on gender.

Table 6 shows gender by field. Overall, 31.7 percent of the grand look-up list (less three missing observations) was female. The field with highest percent female is Journalism/Communications, while the field with by far the lowest percent female is Economics.

TABLE 6. Gender in the five disciplines

	Female	Male	Total
Economics	233 (15.6%)	1,260 (84.4%)	1493
History	634 (34.5%)	1,206 (65.5%)	1840
Journalism/Communications	194 (40.1%)	290 (59.9%)	494
Law	617 (34.1%)	1,191 (65.9%)	1808
Psychology	618 (39.3%)	997 (61.7%)	1615
Total	2,296 (31.7%)	4,944 (68.3%)	7240

Did Trump's candidacy cause a sudden change in the data?

We are concerned that the nomination of Donald Trump might make our data somewhat aberrational, and we discuss the matter in an appendix. Our sense is that any such problem is probably minor, at most, but we confess the possibility and that we cannot be sure.

The demand for and supply of wisdom

The creeping disappearance from the upper echelons of academia of Republicans and most any tenured faculty person who vibrantly dissents from leftist thinking is a noteworthy development. It is said that victors enjoy the spoils—and write the histories.

But the war analogy is imperfect. Even if the academic establishment continues to enjoy vast resources and coercively backed privileges (not only tax dollars but also, for example, what Adam Smith called “privileges of graduation”³¹), discourse remains substantially free, and persons—both outside of academia and within but only rarely high in the pyramid—will challenge the outlooks that are dominant in academia. Works like Jonathan Haidt’s *The Righteous Mind* (2012) and Christian Smith’s *The Sacred Project of American Sociology* (2014) represent a trend toward recognizing that scholarly interpretations and judgments are inseparable from a scholar’s sense of duty to higher purpose, as well as a trend toward recognizing that a human being is by nature a political and, in a broad sense, religious

31. For Smith on “privileges of graduation,” see Smith (1976, 762, 778, 780) and his letter to William Cullen (Smith 1987, 173–179).

animal. We need to discern new emergent networks that have their own systems of interpretation, judgment, and standards. Networks that are not dominated by Democrats are diverse, both intellectually and institutionally. Sometimes they will succeed in establishing a base high in their disciplinary pyramid, as with certain units at Brown, Duke, Princeton, the University of Arizona, and elsewhere. Anyone who cares about the matter must decide for his or her self how a not-Democrat-dominated network is regarded justly.

Appendix 1. Did Trump cause a change in the data?

Donald Trump's successful pursuit of the Republican nomination throws the question of which party is worse into a new light. Passing over that question, we consider a much narrower one. Our data reflects citizens' registration choice through a window of time in which the likelihood of Trump's being nominated passed from quite possible to certain.³² Now, suppose that one morning in June 2015, Trump had woken up and decided to himself: "On second thought, I won't pursue the nomination." In that universe, would the data be much different? Republicans are scarce enough in the fields we examine that such an event plausibly could cause a marked difference in D:R ratios. We raise this question because one might think that our data is like a snapshot taken at a moment that does not represent what was normal before that moment, and, furthermore, may not represent what is normal after that moment. We do not presume to guess the extent to which future Republican normalcy will be 'Trumpish,' and moreover, perhaps Trump's success is *not* aberrational with respect to how Republican 'normalcy' has been evolving in recent years. At any rate, many leading Republican figures were deeply dismayed by Trump's success, and the other contenders for the Republican nomination were more conventional Republican types, so Trump is something of an elephant in the room that needs to be addressed: Does our data represent what, even from the perspective of some future point in time, is regarded to be a somewhat aberrational moment in the statistic studied here, namely, D:R ratios among professors?

32. Using Aristotle, we began collecting our data in April 2016 and continued at a fairly steady rate, concluding in August 2016. Trump's candidacy looked to be quite certain by mid-May. However, when a voter alters his or her registration, the new information must, first, get rolled up by the state, and then it must pass into the commercial databases, so it is impossible for them to be perfectly up to date. We are not sure exactly how not-up-to-date they are, but we are told that Aristotle updates its information as soon as a state makes updated information available.

The short answer is we don't know. There are reasons to think that Trump might have caused a sudden change in the data. Many Republicans have been put off by Trump and what they take him to represent, and that would be especially true for Republicans in the professoriate. On the other hand, consider a Professor Doe, a registered Republican, who strongly dislikes Donald Trump. It is reasonable to imagine that he takes the trouble to alter his voter registration—to Democratic, Libertarian, or (most likely of these three, we think) non-affiliated. But altering one's registration is an irregular activity, and we find it also reasonable to think that Professor Doe would not give a thought to altering his party registration because of the candidate in one Presidential contest. His dislike of Trump may well lead him not to vote for Trump, but it is much less likely, we think, that he would quit the Republican Party because of the Trump development, and still less likely that he would re-register with the Democratic Party. In the way of scenarios and thought experiments, we might also ponder the desire to vote in the primaries, and its possible effect on voter registration.

TABLE 7. Rates of Republican and Democratic registration in the 11 states at two points in time

	1 October 2015	1 August 2016
Republican registrants	16,553,678	16,992,921
% of total	26.9%	26.7%
Democratic registrants	25,191,465	26,010,027
% of total	40.9%	40.8%
<i>Source:</i> Data provided by Voter Lists Online, at our specific request.		

Such speculations are almost all we have to offer. However, Voter Lists Online (the owner of the Aristotle database) kindly provided us with the data shown in Table 7, on voter registration in the 11 states seating the 40 universities (CA, CT, MA, MD, NC, NH, NJ, NY, PA, OH, RI).³³ We see that from October 1, 2015, to August 1, 2016, the number of registrants increased, but the rate for each party stays nearly constant, thus not showing any evidence of a Trump-inspired mass shift into or out of Republican registration.³⁴ But this data is for all citizens, of course, not just professors, and professors very plausibly could have behaved

33. Voter Lists Online provided this data at our special request. We did not ask for or receive any other such data (except that they provided the data for all 30 states for which they have it, not just the 11 reported on in Table 6; for the results for all 30 states see the next footnote). We asked for a first date of October 1, 2015, because at that early point it was much less certain that Trump would win the nomination.

34. Incidentally, Voter Lists Online provided such data on all 30 states for which they have it, and the results are the same in the sense that the party rates remain about the same over time: For October 1, 2015, Republican registrants constituted 30.1 percent, and Democratic 39.8 percent of all registered voters, and for August 1, 2016 the rates are 29.9 percent and 39.7 percent.

systematically differently than the entire state population. In particular it is hard to imagine many among the professoriate being inspired by Trump to join the Republican Party.

Appendix 2. Supplementary tables and information about the release of our data

We have compiled tables (labeled A1 to A6) in an appendix ([link](#)). These tables provide the numbers for the figures appearing in this paper, as well as some supplementary statistics.

Regarding the release of our data, we are prepared to share the data under conditions of strict confidentiality to researchers whose purpose are scholarly. The data contains personal information about voter registration; even with names redacted the gender, age, title, discipline, and university information could be used to infer the individual's voter information. Inquiries about obtaining the data under conditions of strict confidentiality and for scholarly purposes should be directed to Professor Mitchell Langbert at mlangbert@hvc.rr.com.

References

- Abramowitz, Stephen I., Beverly Gomes, and Christine V. Abramowitz.** 1975. Publish or Politic: Referee Bias in Manuscript Review. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 5(3): 187–200.
- Abrams, Samuel J.** 2016a. Professors Moved Left Since 1990s, Rest of Country Did Not. *HeterodoxAcademy.org*, January 9. [Link](#)
- Abrams, Samuel J.** 2016b. There Are Conservative Professors, Just Not in These States. *New York Times*, July 3. [Link](#)
- Burris, Val.** 2004. The Academic Caste System: Prestige Hierarchies in PhD Exchange Networks. *American Sociological Review* 69(2): 239–264.
- Cardiff, Christopher, and Daniel B. Klein.** 2005. Faculty Partisan Affiliations in All Disciplines: A Voter-Registration Study. *Critical Review* 17(3–4): 237–255. [Link](#)
- Chen, Zhengye.** 2014. The Path to Being an Economics Professor: What Difference Does Graduate School Make? *Comparative Advantage* (Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.), Spring: 51–56. [Link](#)

- Duarte, José L., Jarret T. Crawford, Charlotta Stern, Jonathan Haidt, Lee Jussim, and Philip E. Tetlock.** 2015. Political Diversity Will Improve Social Psychological Science. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 38: e130. [Link](#)
- Fosse, Ethan, Neil Gross, and Joseph Ma.** 2014. Political Bias in the Graduate School Admissions Process: A Field Experiment. In *Professors and Their Politics*, eds. Neil Gross and Solon Simmons, 109–133. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Gift, Karen, and Thomas Gift.** 2015. Does Politics Influence Hiring? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment. *Political Behavior* 37(3): 653–675.
- Gross, Neil, and Solon Simmons.** 2007. The Social and Political Views of American Professors. Working paper. [Link](#)
- Haidt, Jonathan.** 2012. *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Inbar, Yoel, and Joris Lammers.** 2012. Political Diversity in Social and Personality Psychology. *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 7(5): 496–503.
- Iyengar, Shanto, and Sean J. Westwood.** 2015. Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization. *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3): 690–697.
- Janis, Irving L.** 1982. *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos*, 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Katz, Daniel Martin, Joshua R. Gubler, Jon Zelner, Michael J. Bommarito II, Eric Provins, and Eitan Ingall.** 2011. Reproduction of Hierarchy? A Social Network Analysis of the American Law Professoriate. *Journal of Legal Education* 61(1): 76–103. [Link](#)
- Klein, Daniel B.** 2005. The Ph.D. Circle in Academic Economics. *Econ Journal Watch* 2(1): 133–148. [Link](#)
- Klein, Daniel B., William L. Davis, and David Hedengren.** 2013. Economics Professors' Voting, Policy Views, Favorite Economists, and Frequent Lack of Consensus. *Econ Journal Watch* 10(1): 116–125. [Link](#)
- Klein, Daniel B., and Charlotta Stern.** 2005. Professors and Their Politics: The Policy Views of Social Scientists. *Critical Review* 17(3–4): 257–303. [Link](#)
- Klein, Daniel B., and Charlotta Stern.** 2006. Sociology and Classical Liberalism. *Independent Review* 11(1): 37–52. [Link](#)
- Klein, Daniel B., and Charlotta Stern.** 2007. Is There a Free-Market Economist in the House? The Policy Views of American Economic Association Members. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 66(2): 309–334.
- Klein, Daniel B., and Charlotta Stern.** 2009a. By the Numbers: The Ideological Profile of Professors. In *The Politically Correct University: Problems, Scope, and Reforms*, eds. Robert Maranto, Richard E. Redding, and Frederick M. Hess, 15–33. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. [Link](#)

- Klein, Daniel B., and Charlotta Stern.** 2009b. Groupthink in Academia: Majoritarian Departmental Politics and the Professional Pyramid. In *The Politically Correct University: Problems, Scope, and Reforms*, eds. Robert Maranto, Richard E. Redding, and Frederick M. Hess, 79–98. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. [Link](#)
- Ladd, Everett Carl Jr., and Seymour Martin Lipset.** 1975. *The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Langbert, Mitchell.** 2016. The Left Orientation of Industrial Relations. *Econ Journal Watch* 13(1): 46–74. [Link](#)
- Lipset, Seymour Martin.** 1982. The Academic Mind at the Top: The Political Behavior and Values of Faculty Elites. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 46(2): 143–168.
- McClintock, Charles G., Charles B. Spaulding, and Henry A. Turner.** 1965. Political Orientations of Academically Affiliated Psychologists. *American Psychologist* 20(3): 211–221.
- McEachern, William A.** 2006. AEA Ideology: Campaign Contributions of American Economic Association Members, Committee Members, Officers, Editors, Referees, Authors, and Acknowledgees. *Econ Journal Watch* 3(1): 148–179. [Link](#)
- Munro, Geoffrey D., Terell P. Lasane, and Scott P. Leary.** 2010. Political Partisan Prejudice: Selective Distortion and Weighting of Evaluative Categories in College Admissions Applications. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 40(9): 2434–2462.
- Olson, Walter.** 2011. *Schools for Misrule: Legal Academia and an Overlanyered America*. New York: Encounter Books.
- Oprisko, Robert.** 2012. Superpowers: The American Academic Elite. *Georgetown Public Policy Review*, December 3. [Link](#)
- Pew Research Center.** 2015. A Deep Dive into Party Affiliation: Sharp Differences by Race, Gender, Generation, Education. April 7. Pew Research Center (Washington, D.C.). [Link](#)
- Rothman, Stanley, April Kelly-Woessner, and Matthew Woessner.** 2011. *The Still Divided Academy: How Competing Visions of Power, Politics, and Diversity Complicate the Mission of Higher Education*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Smith, Adam.** 1976 [1776]. *An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, eds. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, Adam.** 1987. *The Correspondence of Adam Smith*, 2nd ed., eds. E. C. Mossner and I. S. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, Bruce L. R., Jeremy D. Mayer, and A. Lee Fritschler.** 2008. *Closed Minds? Politics and Ideology in American Universities*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

- Smith, Christian.** 2014. *The Sacred Project of American Sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Spaulding, Charles B., and Henry A. Turner.** 1968. Political Orientation and Field of Specialization Among College Professors. *Sociology of Education* 41(3): 247–262.
- Terviö, Marko.** 2011. Divisions Within Academia: Evidence from Faculty Hiring and Placement. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 93(3): 1053–1062.
- 't Hart, Paul.** 1994. *Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Tobin, Gary A., and Aryeh K. Weinberg.** 2006. *A Profile of American College Faculty: Volume I: Political Beliefs & Behavior*. San Francisco: Institute for Jewish & Community Research. [Link](#)
- Townsend, Robert B.** 2015. The Rise and Decline of History Specializations Over the Past 40 Years. *Perspectives on History* (American Historical Association), December. [Link](#)
- Wiggins, David K.** 1983. Wendell Smith, the *Pittsburgh Courier-Journal* and the Campaign to Include Blacks in Organized Baseball, 1933–1945. *Journal of Sport History* 10(2): 5–29.
- Woessner, Matthew, and April Kelly-Woessner.** 2009. Left Pipeline: Why Conservatives Don't Get Doctorates. In *The Politically Correct University: Problems, Scope, and Reforms*, eds. Robert Maranto, Richard E. Redding, and Frederick M. Hess, 38–59. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. [Link](#)
- Yancey, George A.** 2011. *Compromising Scholarship: Religious and Political Bias in American Higher Education*. Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press.

About the Authors



Mitchell Langbert is an associate professor of business at Brooklyn College. He holds an MBA from UCLA, an MBA from the St. John's University School of Risk and Insurance (formerly the College of Insurance), and a Ph.D. in industrial relations from the Columbia University Graduate School of Business. His research has been published in journals such as *Human Resource Management Journal*, *Journal of Business Ethics*, *Academy of Management Learning and Education Journal*, *Benefits Quarterly*, *Journal of Labor Research*, and *Journal of Economic Issues*. At Brooklyn College he teaches managerial skills, human resources, and business writing. His email address is mlangbert@hvc.rr.com.



Anthony J. Quain is a developer of health economics solutions in the private sector. From 1995 to 2006 he was a software engineer and later Director in the development of the National Biomedical Computer System (NBCS), the American Red Cross's blood donor and blood component IT management system. From 2007 to 2015 he served as Product Development Manager and Project Manager in the Clinical and Economic Research department of 3M Health Information Systems. He has coauthored several journal articles on episode payment systems and clinical risk adjustment. At present he manages the implementation of health and identity fraud solutions for Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO). He earned a bachelor's degree in Economics from Georgetown University and a Ph.D. in Economics from George Mason University. He lives with his wife and two daughters in Alexandria, Virginia. His email is tony.quain@gmail.com.



Daniel Klein is the editor of *Econ Journal Watch*, a professor of economics at George Mason University (where he leads a program in Adam Smith), the JIN Chair at the Mercatus Center at GMU, a fellow of the Ratio Institute in Stockholm, and the author of *Knowledge and Coordination: A Liberal Interpretation* (Oxford University Press, 2012). His email address is dklein@gmu.edu.

[Go to archive of Character Issues section](#)
[Go to September 2016 issue](#)



Discuss this article at Journaltalk:
<http://journaltalk.net/articles/5928>